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Some degree of abuse is inseparable from the proper use of every
thing[.]
-James Madison1
A recent addition to the arsenal of weapons given to copyright owners
threatens to tip a delicate balance. The United States Constitution plainly states
that the purpose of copyright law is to promote the progress of knowledge and
learning.2 In order to achieve this goal, the Copyright Act grants to creators of
original works of authorship certain limited rights, often referred to as monopoly
rights. But the rights of copyright owners are limited by and subject to rights
guaranteed by the Copyright Act to users of copyrighted works.3 If copyright
law is to continue to advance its constitutionally mandated goal, the balance
between the rights of copyright owners and the rights of the users of copyrighted
works must not be weighted too heavily in favor of copyright owners.4
1. Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (citing The Report on the Virginia Resolutions of
1798, in 4 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION OF 1787, 571 (1876)).
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. This clause is the source of Congress’s authority to enact the
Copyright Act. The clause provides that Congress shall have the power “[t]o promote the Progress of
Science . . . by securing for Limited Times to Authors . . . the exclusive Right to their . . . Writings.” Id.
The use of the word “science” in this context should be understood in its eighteenth century meaning,
broadly denoting knowledge and learning. See Arthur H. Seidel, The Constitution and a Standard of
Patentability, 48 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 5, 12 n.14 (1966) (noting that the most authoritative dictionary at
the time listed “knowledge” as the first definition of “science”).
3. The rights granted to copyright owners in 17 U.S.C. § 106 are expressly “subject to” the rights
granted to users of copyrighted works codified in 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-120 (1994).
4. Copyright law is often referred to as incorporating a balance between the rights granted to
copyright owners and the rights granted to the users of copyrighted material. See, e.g., Twentieth Century
Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (discussing copyright as reflecting a “balance of
competing claims upon the public interest”); Wainwright Sec. Inc. v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d
91, 94 (2d Cir. 1977) (noting a balance between the rights of copyright owners and the rights of the
public).
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On December 16, 1997 President Clinton signed into law the “No Electronic
Theft (NET) Act”5 expanding the types of activities that give rise to liability for
criminal copyright infringement by eliminating the requirement that the
defendant’s infringement be motivated by profit or commercial gain. This
expansion in the scope of activities subject to criminal penalties threatens to
undermine the fundamental purpose of copyright; the promotion of knowledge
and learning.
The NET Act was proposed for the express purpose of closing a loophole
identified in United States v. LaMacchia,6 but it accomplished far more than
merely filling an inadvertent gap in the law. The NET Act brings within the
scope of criminal copyright infringement a broad range of activities that
previously would not have given rise to criminal liability.
Despite its name, the NET Act applies to more than infringement on the
Internet or infringement in electronic media. This Act criminalizes the
reproduction or distribution of one or more copies of copyrighted works that
have an aggregate retail value of over $1,000 during any 180 day period,
regardless of how those copies are created or distributed.7 While he
infringement must be willful to qualify as a criminal violation, the statute no
longer requires that the infringement be undertaken for commercial advantage or
private financial gain in order to give rise to criminal liability.
The ultimate aim of copyright in the United States, as stated in the
Constitution, is the promotion of knowledge and learning.8 Copy ight achieves
this goal by both providing a mechanism for the remuneration of authors of
creative works, and permitting certain types of uses of copyrighted works
without the need for authorization from the copyright owner. Over the past two
hundred years the monopoly of the copyright has expanded significantly. From
increasing the basic term of a copyright9 to increasing the types of activities that
5. No Electronic Theft (NET) Act, Pub.L. No. 105-147, 111 Stat. 2678 (1997) [hereinafter the
“NET Act”]. The idea of a “net” being cast around criminal infringers was used earlier in United States v.
Bily, 406 F. Supp. 726, 733 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (noting that the copyright act “casts a smaller net” around
criminal violations).
6. 871 F. Supp. 535 (D. Mass. 1994).
7. The NET Act provides that willfully infringing copyright by “reproduction or distribution,
including by electronic means,” is a criminal offense. 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)(2) (Supp. III 1997). However,
the “including” language is expressly defined in the Copyright Act to be “illustrative and not limitative.”
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
8. See supra note 2.
9. The original term of copyright in this country was fourteen years, with a possible renewal for
another fourteen years. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124 (1790). The current term of
copyright is measured by the life of the author plus seventy years. 17 U.S.C.A. § 302 (West Supp. 1999).
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a copyright owner can control,10 copyright law has evolved into a profit
maximizing tool for the powerful content industry. The NET Act is but one of
the latest expansions of the rights of copyright owners in the saga of ever
increasing monopoly rights for copyright owners in this country.11 The pace
with which Congress has increased the scope of the criminal sanctions in
copyright law has accelerated exponentially in the last fifteen years, culminating
with the NET Act.12
With each expansion of copyright owners rights, the justification has been
that increased protection will lead to greater incentives for creation. With the
NET Act, advocates of expansion made their case in a different form. They
argued that without the sought-after criminal sanctions, the incentives to
produce certain kinds of works or to place existing works in digital media would
remain at an unacceptably low level.13 Digitization has changed the landscape of
how creative works, the subject of copyright protection, may be distributed.
Supporters of the NET Act argued that the fear of rampant, unauthorized
copying has the potential to slow the transition to digital technology and digital
transmission. Copyright owners worry that if they place their works in digital
10. Originally, copyright owners were given the right to print, publish, and vend their works. Act of
May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124 (1790). Under the current law, copyright owners not only have the
right to control reproduction (printing and publishing) and public distribution (vending), they also have
the right to create derivative works based on the copyrighted work, to publicly perform the work, and to
publicly display the work. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994).
11. The increase of criminal sanctions in the area of copyright law can be seen as a form of
economic rent seeking. See Lanier Saperstein, Comment, Copyrights, Criminal Sanctions and Economic
Rents: Applying the Rent Seeking Model to The Criminal Law Formulation Process, 87 J. CRIM. L &
CRIMINOLOGY 1470 (1997). The main goal of the groups seeking to increase the criminal sanctions
available for copyright infringement is simple wealth maximization. Id. at 1493.
12. It is perhaps inaccurate to characterize the NET Act as the culmination of the increase in
criminal sanctions. Less than one year after the enactment of the NET Act, Congress passed the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act which created criminal penalties for willfully circumventing technological
protections placed on copyrighted works. These new criminal sanctions also apply to those who alter or
omit copyright management information. The criminal penalties carry a maximum fine of $500,000 or
imprisonment for not more than five years, or both, for the first offense; and maximum fines of $1,000,000
or imprisonment for not more than ten years, or both, for any subsequent offense. Digital Millenium
Copyright Act, § 103, 17 U.S.C.A. § 1204 (West Supp. 1999). These new criminal sanctions are part of a
unique right codified in title 17 of the United States Code. This paracopyright grants to the owner of a
copyrighted work an additional right to control access to their work through technological protections and
to have legal protection against the circumvention of those technological protections. 17 U.S.C.A. § 1201
(West Supp. 1999). See Note, The Criminalization of Copyright Infringement in the Digital Era, 112
HARV. L. REV. 1705, 1716-18 (1999).
13. NET Act, 1997: Hearing on H.R. 2265 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual
Property of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1997) (statement of Greg Wrenn, on
behalf of the Business Software Alliance) (noting that “piracy acts as a powerful disincentive to
entrepreneurs who might otherwise bring new products to market but are worried that they will be unable
to do so profitably because of the theft of their products.”).
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medium the ease of copying will reduce their revenue stream to unacceptable
levels. Thus, the increase in criminal sanctions was justified as a means to
encourage not only the creation of new works but the use of digital technology.14
The NET Act, as written, may expand the scope of rights granted to
copyright owners too far. However, several important aspects of criminal
copyright infringement, if properly applied by prosecutors and judges, will help
to keep the copyright monopoly from becoming overly broad. With this proper
application, the NET Act can still function as a deterrent for the majority of the
types of infringement that were the catalyst for its passage.
Part I of this Article examines the historical evolution of criminal copyright
infringement in this country, culminating in the adoption of the NET Act. Part I
also provides an overview of the changes in criminal copyright infringement
affected by the NET Act.
Part II analyzes why, after 100 years, Congress eliminated the requirement
of a profit motive for criminal liability and significantly expanded the reach of
the criminal sanctions of the Copyright Act. Part II also describes not just the
decisional impetus for the amendment to the Copyright Act, United States v.
LaMacchia,15 but the underlying pressures placed on copyright law by the
digitization of copyrighted works and the commodification of the intangible
rights granted by copyright law.
Part III explores the possible reach of this new Act, questioning whether it
casts the net of criminal infringement too wide.
Finally, Part IV addresses the importance of the element of willfulness
retained in the statute. This section discusses the interpretation of the term
“willful” by the Supreme Court in other areas of law and the interpretation that
term has been given by lower courts in the context of the Copyright Act. This
section proposes that to prove criminal copyright infringement the government
should be required to show that the defendant intentionally violated a known
legal duty and that the defendant lacked a good faith belief that the conduct at
issue was lawful. Only with this standard in place can the NET Act be kept
within reasonable bounds and not risk deterring the lawful and socially
productive activity which underlying policies of the Copyright Act seek to
encourage.
14. See, e.g., INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE
NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS 178 (1995) [hereinafter THE WHITE PAPER].
15. 871 F. Supp. 535 (D. Mass. 1994).
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I. THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF CRIMINAL COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
A. An Early History
Federal copyright protection existed for more than 100 years without any
criminal penalties for infringement. From 1790, the year of the first federal
copyright act,16 until 1897, copyright infringement was exclusively a civil
matter. In 1897 Congress added the first criminal provision to the Copyright
Act.17 This provision created criminal sanctions only for unlawful public
performances and representations of copyrighted dramatic or musical
compositions. The mens rea18 standard under this first criminal provision
required that the infringement be done “willfully.”19 The infringing conduct also
needed to be “for profit” in order to constitute a criminal offense.20 Criminal
copyright infringement was classified as a misdemeanor offense.21 The 1897
Act was very narrow in scope. Infringement by activities other than public
performances or representations22 or i fringement of copyrighted works other
16. Act of May 31, 1790, 1 Stat. 124 (1790). While the Act of May 31, 1790, was the first federal
copyright act, seven years earlier the Continental Congress passed a resolution recommending that the
several states secure copyrights to authors or publishers of new books. Resolution of the Continental
Congress Respecting Copyright, JOURNAL OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS ASSEMBLED,
CONTAINING THE PROCEEDINGS FROM NOV. 1782 TO NOV. 1783, pp. 256-57 (Philadelphia, C.D.
Claypoole 1783) reprinted in MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 8 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT,
app. 7-11 (1998) [hereinafter NIMMER]. None of the state statutes provided for criminal sanctions for
violations of the copyrights granted to authors. North Carolina came closest to imposing criminal-like
sanctions, requiring that double damages be assessed against an infringer with half of the damage amount
paid to the state. LAWS OF THE STATE OF NORTH-CAROLINA. PUBLISHED ACCORDING TO ACT OF
ASSEMBLY, BY JAMES IREDELL 563-64. (Edenton, Hodge & Wills 1791) reprinted in 8 NIMMER app. 7-
34 (1998). For over 100 years, federal copyright law also provided for a similar type of civil forfeiture of
one half of the damages assessed in infringement actions. See 2 Stat. 171 §§ 3, 4 (April 29, 1802); 4
State. 36 §§ 6, 7, 11 (Feb. 3, 1831); 6 Stat. 212 §§ 98, 100 (July 8, 1870); Rev. Stat., Title 60, §§ 4963,
4965 pp. 957-960 (1873); 26 Stat. 1106 §§ 6, 8 (March 3, 1891); 28 Stat. 965 (March 2, 1895); 29 Stat.
694 (March 3, 1897) reprinted in 8 NIMMER app. 7-45 to 7-95 (1998).
17. Act of Jan. 6, 1897, 29 Stat. 481 (1897).
18. Mens rea is but one basic premise defining criminal conduct. The other premise is actus reus.
The actus reus and mens rea must occur simultaneously, the conduct must have resulted in harm, the
conduct must have been the legal cause of the harmful result, and the conduct must have been forbidden
expressly by law with advance notice that the conduct is criminal. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W.
SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 3.1 (2d ed. 1986).
19. Act of Jan. 6, 1897, 29 Stat. 481 (1897).
20. Id.
21. See id.
22. A copyrighted work may be infringed in several different ways. For example, reproducing the
work in copies constitutes an infringement, as does creating a derivative work or selling copies of the
copyrighted work. Under the current Copyright Act, six different rights are granted to copyright owners:
(1) the right to reproduce the work in copies; (2) the right to prepare derivative works based on the
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol77/iss3/3
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than dramatic or musical compositions23 were not subject to criminal penalties,
even if undertaken willfully and for profit.
The 1909 Copyright Act retained the requirement that the infringement “be
willful and for profit” in order to give rise to criminal sanctions, but expanded
criminal infringement to include all types of copyrighted works and all
categories of infringing activity.24 As in the 1897 provision, the 1909 Act
classified criminal infringement as a misdemeanor offense.25
The criminal provision of the Copyright Act remained basically unchanged
for the next sixty years.26 The 1976 Copyright Act, the current copyright law,
resulted in only minor changes in the realm of criminal copyright infringement.
First, the 1976 Act changed the wording of the mens rea standard for criminal
culpability. Under the 1909 Act, criminal liability required infringement that
was “willful and for profit,” whereas the 1976 Act defined criminal
infringement as infringement done “willfully and for purposes of commercial
advantage or private financial gain . . . .”27 While it is debatable whether this
change in phraseology actually altered the proof required for criminal liability,28
a profit or financial motive clearly remained the touchstone of criminal
infringement.
The second change implemented by the 1976 Act was an increase in the
copyrighted work; (3) the right to distribute copies of the work to the public; (4) for certain types of
works, the right to perform the work publicly; (5) for certain works, the right to publicly display the work;
and (6) for sound recordings, the right to publicly perform the work by means of a digital audio
transmission. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994 & Supp. I 1995). This first criminal infringement provision only
addressed infringement through public performance or representation.
23. Under current copyright law many different types of works are eligible for protection, including
literary works, pictorial works, sculptural works, musical works, dramatic works, architectural works, and
sound recordings. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994).
24. See Copyright Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 28, 35 Stat. 1075, 1082 (codified as amended at
17 U.S.C. § 104 (1947)).
25. The 1909 Act retained the classification of criminal copyright infringement as a misdemeanor,
with penalties of up to one year in jail. The 1909 Act also permitted a fine between $100 and $1,000 to be
applied. See id.; see also Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 335, 35 Stat. 1152 (1909) (defining
misdemeanors as offenses punishable by imprisonment for one year or less).
26. In those sixty years Congress made only one change. In 1974, Congress added criminal liability
for “knowingly and willfully” aiding and abetting an infringement. Act of Dec. 31, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-
573, title I, § 102, 88 Stat. 1873 (1974).
27. 17 U.S.C. app. § 506(a) (1976) (effective Jan. 1, 1978).
28. See United States v. LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. 535, 539 (D. Mass. 1994) (suggesting that the
mens rea requirement was eased by the language in the 1976 Act); see also Saperstein, supra note 11, at
1478. The legislative history of the 1976 Act indicates that Congress may not have thought it was
changing the standard. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476 at 163 (1976); S. REP. NO. 94-473 at 145
(1975) (referring to the basic criminal offense under the 1976 Act as “willful infringement for profit”); see
also 4 Nimmer § 15.01 n.1.2 (1999) (stating that the new phraseology of the 1976 Act was intended as
the equivalent of the phrase “for profit” used in the 1909 Act).
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penalties for criminal infringement. Previously, misdemeanor penalties of up to
one year imprisonment and $1,000 in fines constituted the maximum
punishment for criminal infringement.29 The 1976 Act, while retaining the
misdemeanor designation, provided that first time offenders could be imprisoned
for up to one year and fined up to $10,000.30 The fine could be increased to
$25,000 if the infringement involved sound recordings or motion pictures.31
Repeat offenders were subject to imprisonment for up to two years and fines of
up to $50,000.32 The 1976 Act also provided for the mandatory destruction of
all infringing copies or phonorecords and “all implements, devices, or equipment
used in the manufacture of such infringing copies or phonorecords.”33
B. Felonious Infringement
While the criminal provisions of the Copyright Act had remained essentially
unchanged for almost 70 years, once change began a snowball effect occurred,
culminating in the NET Act.34 Significant change first began in 1982. During
the late 1970’s and early 1980’s, representatives of the motion picture and
record industry argued that the misdemeanor provisions were too lenient.35 Firs ,
they argued that misdemeanor penalties did not deter large scale copyright
pirates.36 They also asserted that because the offense was only a misdemeanor,
29. See supra note 25.
30. 17 U.S.C. app. § 506(a) (1976).
31. Id. This increased penalty was only available if the infringement consisted of the unauthorized
exercise of the right to reproduce the work or the right to publicly distribute the work. Additionally, if the
work infringed was a sound recording, creating a derivative work could give rise to criminal liability. In
addition, if the work was a motion picture, performing the work publicly could also give rise to criminal
liability. See supra note 22 (discussing the different rights granted to a copyright holder that create the
different ways to infringe a work).
32. 17 U.S.C. app. § 506(b) (1976).
33. Id. Section 506(b) of the Act provides that “the court in its judgement of conviction shall . . .
order the forfeiture and destruction or other disposition of all infringing copies or phonorecords . . . .” Id.
(emphasis added).
34. The NET Act may not be the final culmination in the expansion of scope of criminal copyright
infringement. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
35. In a joint statement to Congress, the Motion Picture Association of America, Inc., and the
Recording Industry Association of America, Inc., estimated that by 1979 record and film piracy was
“stealing” more than “$650 million annually from legitimate sales and rentals in both industries.”
Hearings on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong.
10,694, 10,697 (1979). Industry also argued that even first offenses should be punishable as felonies as
are other “economic” crimes, such as antitrust violations. Hearings on H.R. 2223, Before the Subcomm.
on Courts, Civil Liberties & the Admin. of Justice, 94th Cong. 716 (1975) (statement of Jack Valenti,
President of the Motion Picture Association of America and the Association of Motion Picture and
Television Producers, Inc.).
36. See id.
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U.S. Attorneys were not interested in prosecuting individuals for criminal
copyright infringement.37 This argument was confirmed by representatives from
the Department of Justice.38
In early 1982, Congress obliged industry and, for the first time, designated
certain categories of first-time infringements as felonies. Congress did not,
however, alter the requisite mental intent element for criminal liability;
infringement still had to be committed “willfully” and the infringement still
needed to be “for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain . .
. .”39 Congress, however, significantly enhanced the penalties for various types
of infringement. The 1982 amendments applied these increased penalties only to
infringement of motion pictures, audiovisual works, and sound recordings and
only if the infringement occurred through reproduction or distribution40 of
infringing copies or phonorecords.41 Importantly, reproduction or distribution of
these limited categories of works were felonies only if they were significant in
quantity.
The types of activities classified as felonies under the 1982 amendments
were based on the number of copies made or sold within any 180-day period.
Congress created two classes of felonies. The more serious infringements
carried penalties of up to five years imprisonment and $250,000 in fines.42
These more serious felonies required the reproduction or distribution during any
180 day period of at least one thousand copies of one or more sound
recordings.43 For motion pictures or audiovisual works the threshold number
required was only sixty-five copies of one or more works.44 The 1982
37. See id.; see also, Robert A. Spanner, The Brave New World of Criminal Software Infringement
Prosecutions, 12 COMPUTER LAW. 1, 2 (Nov. 1995) (noting software industry concerns that law
enforcement policies result in piracy). The problem of prosecutors not wanting to prosecute individuals for
criminal copyright infringement led to a focus on prosecuting these individuals on other, more serious
charges, such as mail or wire fraud and even interstate transportation of stolen property. See id.; see also
Mary Jan Saunders, Criminal Copyright Infringement and the Copyright Felony Act, 71 DENV. U. L.
REV. 671, 675 (1994). The Supreme Court, however, put an end to that practice in United States v.
Dowling, 473 U.S. 207 (1985), discussed infra Section II.A.
38. See Saunders, supra note 37, at 683.
39. Piracy and Counterfeiting Amendments Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-180, 96 Stat. 91 (1982)
(codified at 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1982)).
40. See supra note 22 (explaining the different rights granted to a copyright owner).
41. The Copyright Act uses the term “copies” to refer to material objects, other than phonorecords,
in which a work is fixed, whereas “phonorecords” are defined by the Act as material objects in which
sounds (other than the sounds accompanying a motion picture or other audio visual work) are fixed. 17
U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
42. 18 U.S.C. § 2319(b)(1) (1988).
43. 18 U.S.C. § 2319(b)(1)(A) (1988).
44. 18 U.S.C. § 2319(b)(1)(B) (1988).
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amendments also subjected repeat offenders to the maximum penalties
regardless of the number of copies at issue or the types of works infringed, so
long as both offenses involved sound recordings, motion pictures, or other
audiovisual works.45 The 1982 amendments also created a second category of
felonies involving smaller numbers of copies. For the reproduction or
distribution within any 180 day period of at least one hundred copies of sound
recordings or at least seven copies of motion picture or audiovisual works, the
penalties included up to $250,000 in fines, but only a maximum of two years
imprisonment.46
All remaining criminal infringements were misdemeanors, subjecting the
offender to up to $25,000 in fines and one year imprisonment.47 Thus,
misdemeanor offenses included those infringements that were committed
“willfully and for the purpose of commercial advantage or private financial
gain,” but (1) were not infringements of sound recordings, motion pictures, or
audiovisual works, regardless of the magnitude of the infringement, (2) were
infringements of those types of works through reproduction or distribution, but
did not meet the threshold quantity of copies set out above, or (3) were
infringements of sound recording, motion picture, or audiovisual works, but
were infringements committed by the creation of a derivative work or by public
performance.48
Because the changes in 1982 only applied to motion pictures and other
audiovisual works and sound recordings, computer software manufacturers felt
disadvantaged. As their market grew, computer software manufacturers turned
to Congress, seeking the application of felony penalties for infringement of their
works as well.49 In 1991, Senator Hatch introduced Senate Bill 893 to add
computer software to the types of works which, when infringed willfully and for
commercial advantage or private financial gain, would be a felony.50 This
proposed legislation turned into The Copyright Felony Act51 which expanded
the scope of the felony provisions to include not just computer software, but all
types of works.52 The Copyright Felony Act also increased the severity of the
45. 18 U.S.C. § 2319(b)(1)(C) (1988).
46. 18 U.S.C. § 2319(b)(2) (1988).
47. 18 U.S.C. § 2319(b)(3) (1988).
48. United States v. Gallant, 570 F. Supp. 303, 314 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). See also supra notes 22-23
(explaining the different ways to infringe a copyright and the different categories of works subject to
copyright protection).
49. See Spanner, supra note 37, at 2.
50. S. 893, 102d Cong. (1991).
51. The Copyright Felony Act, Pub. L. No. 102-561, 106 Stat. 4233 (1992).
52. While S. 893 passed the Senate, CONG. REC. S7581 (daily ed. June 4, 1992), there was no
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applicable penalties for second offenders to ten years imprisonment and
significantly lowered the number of copies necessary to qualify as a felony.
After the 1992 amendments, a felony required the reproduction or distribution
of a mere ten copies or phonorecords in any 180 day period so long as the retail
value was more than $2,500.53
C. Felonies Without Profit—The NET Act
The 1982 and 1992 amendments to the Copyright Act marked a turning
point in criminal copyright infringement by classifying certain kinds of
infringement as felonies. Yet, both of these amendments left intact the central
elements of criminal copyright infringement: to be criminal, infringement had to
be undertaken willfully and for commercial advantage or private financial gain.
The NET Act changed that, departing from what had been the standard for
more than one hundred years.
While the NET Act retained the element of willfulness, it created a new type
of criminal infringement that does not require a profit motive. Now, to be
criminal, infringement must be willful and be either (1) for purposes of
commercial advantage or private financial gain,54 or (2) infringement through
the reproduction or distribution, including by electronic means, during any
180-day period, of one or more copies or phonorecords of one or more
copyrighted works, which have a total retail value of more than $1,000.55 T is
latter category of infringement can be referred to as non-commercially
motivated infringement.
Significantly, only infringement through reproduction or distribution56 is
criminally actionable when the infringement is non-commercially motivated.
The willful reproduction of one infringing copy of a high priced software
program would be a criminal offense even if the infringer lacked a profit motive
for the copying. For example, it would violate the NET Act if a person made a
companion bill in the House. In the House, an amendment in the nature of a substitution was endorsed and
later approved by both the Senate and the House. The reason given by Representative William Hughes,
who proposed the amendment, was to avoid a piecemeal approach to copyright legislation and to treat all
types of copyrighted works equally. See H.R. REP. NO. 102-997 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3569, 3572.
53. See 18 U.S.C. § 2319(b)(1) (1994); 18 U.S.C. § 357(b)-(c) (1994).
54. NET Act § 2(b), 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1) (Supp. III 1997). The NET Act also clarified the
definition of “financial gain” to include the “receipt, or expectation of receipt, of anything of value,
including the receipt of other copyrighted works.” 17 U.S.C. § 101.
55. 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)(2).
56. See supra note 22 (explaining the different rights granted to a copyright owner).
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copy of a licensed program from her computer at work for her home computer
so that she could continue to work on a project while caring for an elderly
relative.57
When first introduced into the criminal copyright infringement scheme by
the Copyright Felony Act, numerical thresholds of the number of copies made
or distributed and the retail value of those copies were rationalized as the
determining factor in the felony/misdemeanor distinction because a larger
number of copies indicated a more serious crime, deserving of classification as a
felony. However, these numerical thresholds only came into play for
infringements that were already determined to be willful and for profit. Now, the
numerical thresholds have become a dividing line not between degrees of
criminal offense, but between civil and criminal infringement, without regard to
a profit motive. The NET Act eliminated the requirement of a profit motive for
infringement to give rise to criminal liability, and instead uses a numerical
threshold of one copy and a retail value requirement of only $1,000 to define
criminal infringement.58 Because the numerical thresholds are set so low
pursuant to the NET Act and the profit motive requirement has been eliminated,
the only criterion which truly distinguishes civil versus criminal infringement is
“willfulness.”59
Because the NET Act criminalized non-commercially motivated
infringement, the Act did provide for somewhat lessened punishment for that
type of felony infringement. While a criminal offense motivated by profit can be
punished by up to five years imprisonment plus fines,60 the non-commercially
57. There are many programs that have a retail price of over $1,000. See, e.g., CDW Product
Overview (visited Aug. 23, 1998) <http://www.cdw.com> (listing DenebaCad for Macintosh at
$1,289.12, and Adobe After Effects V4.0 Bundle for $1,336.65). Additionally, there are numerous other,
seemingly innocuous, ways to exceed the $1,000 threshold. See infra Part III.A for a discussion of three
other scenarios. With this scenario, and the others described later in this Article, the importance of the
“willful” element cannot be overstated. Willfulness is discussed in Part IV of this Article.
58. One who willfully infringes a copyright “by the reproduction or distribution, including by
electronic means, during any 180-day period, of one or more copies or phonorecords of one or more
copyrighted works, which have a total retail value of more than $1,000” is a criminal infringer even if that
person does not engage in the infringement for commercial advantage or private financial gain. 17 U.S.C.
§ 506(a)(2) (Supp. III 1997). While the NET Act created an entirely new type of criminal infringement, it
left intact the numerical and monetary thresholds for distinguishing a felony from a misdemeanor: a felony
still requires a minimum of ten copies which have a minimum retail value of $2,500 within any 180 day
period. 18 U.S.C. § 2319(b)(1), (c)(1) (Supp. III 1997). The NET Act also clarified that reproduction or
distribution by electronic means is included in the felony provisions. NET Act § 2(d)(2)(A). The retail
value of $2,500 is a total retail value. NET Act § 2(d)(2) (striking “with a retail value of more than
$2,500” and inserting “which have a total retail value of more than $2,500”).
59. The significance of the “willfulness” requirement is discussed in Part IV of this article.
60. 18 U.S.C. § 2319(b)(1).
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motivated infringement carries a maximum penalty of three years plus fines.61
Likewise, repeat offenders engaged in willful infringement for profit face a ten
year maximum sentence62 while repeat offenders engaged in willful infringement
that is non-commercially motivated face a maximum of six years
imprisonment.63 Infringements classified as misdemeanors include for-profit
criminal infringement that fails to meet the felony $2,500 retail value
requirement64 and non-commercially motivated infringement that fails to meet
the felony threshold of $2,500, but does exceed the criminal threshold of
$1,000.65
The number of offenses, the numerical and retail value thresholds, and the
maximum penalties are summarized in the following tables.
Type 1 Violations:66 Infringing willfully and for purposes of commercial
advantage or private financial gain
Retail Value* Under $1,000 $1,000-$2,500$2,500+ Repeat Offenders
Minimum No.
of Copies*
1 1 10 N.A.
Criminal Yes Yes Yes Yes
Classification Misdemeanor MisdemeanorFelony Felony
Maximum 1 yr. 1 yr. 5 yrs. 10 yrs.
  * The number of copies made and the total retail values are calculated for any 180-day
period.
Type 2 Violation:67 Infringing willfully by reproduction or distribution (no
commercial or financial motive required)
Retail Value* Under $1,000 $1,000-$2,500$2,500+ Repeat Offenders
Minimum No.
of Copies*
1 1 10 N.A.
Criminal No Yes Yes Yes
Classification N.A. Misdemeanor Felony Felony
Maximum N.A. 1 yr. 3 yrs. 6 yrs.
61. 18 U.S.C. § 2319(c)(1).
62. 18 U.S.C. § 2319(b)(2).
63. 18 U.S.C. § 2319(c)(2).
64. 18 U.S.C. § 2319(b)(3).
65. 18 U.S.C. § 2319(c)(3); 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)(2).
66. 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1); 18 U.S.C. § 2319(b).
67. 17 U.S.C. § 506(a); 18 U.S.C. § 2319(c).
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 * The number of copies made and the total retail values are calculated for any 180-day
period.
As these tables illustrate, unless the total retail value of the copies made is
less than $1,000, willful infringement without a profit motive is equally criminal
as with a profit motive. If convicted, however, the penalty a non-commercially
motivated infringer faces may be slightly less than if the defendant engaged in
the infringement for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial
gain.68
D. Other Details of the NET Act
Although not nearly as significant as the elimination of the profit motive, the
NET Act made two other notable changes to criminal prosecutions for
copyright infringement. First, the Act increased the statute of limitations for
criminal prosecutions to five years.69 Previously, civil and criminal actions had
to be brought within three years. The justifications given for increasing the
limitations period to five years included arguments that such increase brings
copyright crimes into line with other criminal acts under title 18,70 and hat it
may take longer to track these new-age criminals.71 In a  era of digital
technology where everything seems to move at a much quicker pace this latter
argument seems difficult to understand.
A statute of limitations that is two years longer for criminal actions than for
civil actions may create unintended consequences. While the NET Act does
bring criminal copyright prosecutions in line with other criminal prosecutions, it
places the criminal copyright prosecutions out of sync with civil copyright
infringement actions. One consequence of this disharmony is that prosecutors
may see more demands for criminal prosecution when the infringement is
discovered more than three years after it occurred. At that point civil action
would be foreclosed,72 but criminal prosecution could still be brought.73
68. The actual time served will depend on the sentencing guidelines which could make the actual
sentence meted out quite similar.
69. 17 U.S.C. § 507(a).
70. See 143 CONG. REC. S12,689-S12,691 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997) (statements in support of
passage of the NET Act by Sen. Ott and Andrew Fois, Assistant Attorney General).
71. See Copyright Piracy, and H.R. 2265, The No Electronic Theft (NET) Act: Hearing on H.R.
2265 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
105th Cong. 149 (1997) (statement of Fritz Attaway, Senior Vice President, Motion Picture Association
of America).
72. 17 U.S.C. § 507(b) (1994).
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The difference between the civil and criminal statutes of limitations may also
impact the civil trial strategy. In the past some civil plaintiffs may have waited
for the criminal case to conclude before pursuing civil actions with regard to the
same infringing activities.74 Strategically, such a delay is efficient because a
criminal conviction, with its higher burden of proof, can be used as evidence in
the subsequent civil case.75 Now, in some cases, this efficient delay strategy will
no longer be an option because the civil statute of limitations will run before
some criminal cases are concluded.
Finally, the NET Act specifies that victims of criminal copyright
infringement shall be permitted to submit victim impact statements.76 In addition
to the holder of the copyright in the works infringed, the NET Act defines the
victim of criminal copyright infringement to include both producers and sellers
of legitimate works affected by the defendant’s conduct.77 These victims of
infringement shall be permitted to include information identifying the scope of
injury and loss suffered, including an estimate of the economic impact of the
offense on that victim. This testimony, in turn, will provide useful evidence for
purposes of the sentencing guidelines established pursuant to this Act.78 The
mandatory inclusion of victim impact statements places yet another weapon in
the hands of copyright owners and their licensees: the ability to influence the
sentence in each instance of criminal conviction.79
73. Section 507 now provides that a criminal proceeding must be brought “within 5 years after the
cause of action arose,” while civil actions must be commenced “within three years after the claim
accrued.” 17 U.S.C. § 507(a)(b) (Supp. III 1997). It remains to be seen whether this difference in phrasing
will have any significance. See 3 NIMMER § 12.05[A] n.2 (1998) (noting the query). The time the claim
accrued is the time that the infringement occurred. See Hoste v. Radio Corp. of Am., 654 F.2d 11 (6th
Cir. 1981) (per curiam). Any tolling of the statute of limitations must be based on “an equitable ground
recognized under federal law,” not state tolling statutes. 3 NIMMER § 12.05[B].
74. See, e.g., R.S.O. Records, Inc. v. Peri, 596 F. Supp. 849, 854 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
75. See FED. R. EVID. 803(22) (providing that a felony conviction is admissible “to prove any fact
essential to sustain the judgment”).
76. See NET Act § 3, 18 U.S.C. § 2319(d) (Supp. III 1997).
77. See id. The NET Act also included similar amendments concerning the submission of victim
impact statements in offenses involving the unauthorized fixation and trafficking in live musical
performances and the trafficking in counterfeit goods or services. See 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2319A(d), 2320(d)
(West Supp. 1999).
78. The mandatory inclusion of this kind of information is in keeping with the trend of allowing
victim impact statements in other criminal cases. See generally DOUGLAS E. BELOOF, VICTIMS IN
CRIMINAL LAW 621-65 (1999).
79. As of May 1999, the Sentencing Commission had not yet implemented any of the changes
required by the NET Act because of a lack of Sentencing Commissioners. See Statement of the
Honorable Howard Coble before the Senate Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property (May 12,
1999) (available at 1999 WL 16947634). Senator Coble also indicated that as of May 1999 there had
been no prosecutions under the NET Act. Id. Subsequent to those hearings, the government obtained its
first conviction under the NET Act when a University of Oregon student pleaded guilty to criminal
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II. WHY DID CONGRESS ELIMINATE THE PROFIT MOTIVE REQUIREMENT
AFTER 100 YEARS IN THE STATUTE?
The NET Act instituted major changes in the definition of criminal copyright
infringement. Criminal infringement had existed in this country for over 100
years, always requiring that the government prove the defendant engaged in the
infringing activity for profit or commercial gain. Why, after 100 years, did
Congress feel the need to eliminate this requirement? Some would answer that
question with one name—David LaMacchia. While the court decision in United
States v. LaMacchia80 did highlight a growing problem, the underlying reasons
for the NET Act are much more complex and stem from the impact of digital
technology and the increasingly prevalent view of copyright as property
equivalent to automobiles and jewelry.
A. The Simple Answer: David LaMacchia
The NET Act was expressly proposed to address a gap in the law identified
in United States v. LaMacchia.81 In LaMacchia, a twenty-one-year-old student
at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, David LaMacchia, had facilitated
the uploading and downloading of significant quantities of copyrighted software
on an electronic bulletin board.82 The defendant was not prosecuted for criminal
copyright infringement because he was not receiving payment from anyone for
copies of the software.83 At the time of his prosecution, criminal copyright
infringement required a showing that the infringement was undertaken for
“commercial advantage or private financial gain.”84 Bec use this necessary
copyright infringement for operating a site where copyrighted software, music, and movies were available
for free downloading. Ashbel S. Green, Net Piracy Law Gets First Conviction: UO Student, OREGONIAN,
Aug. 21, 1999, at A1.
80. 871 F. Supp. 535 (D. Mass. 1994).
81. See, e.g., “This bill plugs the ‘LaMacchia Loophole’ in criminal copyright enforcement.” 143
CONG. REC. 12,689 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1993) (statement in support of passage of the NET Act by Sen.
Hatch).
82. David LaMacchia used MIT’s computer network to gain access to the Internet where he
encouraged correspondents to upload popular software programs (for example Excel 5.0 and Wordperfect
6.0) to an encrypted address on an electronic bulletin board. He then transferred these programs to a
second address where he invited correspondents to download the programs for no charge. LaMacchia, 871
F. Supp. at 536.
83. The court never held that LaMacchia was not engaging in the infringement for profit because the
government chose not to prosecute him for criminal copyright infringement and did not allege that he
sought or derived any personal benefit from the activity. LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. at 536-37. Thus the
issue of the profit nature of his activities was not before the court.
84. 17 U.S.C. § 506 (1994).
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element was lacking, David LaMacchia was prosecuted for wire fraud rather
than criminal copyright infringement.85
Mr. LaMacchia brought a motion to dismiss his indictment, arguing that the
use of the wire fraud statute in this context was improper and precluded by the
Supreme Court’s decision in Dowling v. United States.86 In Dowling, the
Supreme Court reversed the defendant’s convictions for interstate transportation
of stolen property, holding that “a copyrighted musical composition . . .
impressed on a bootleg phonograph record is not property that is stolen,
converted, or taken by fraud within the meaning of the Stolen Property Act.”87
The Supreme Court went on to state that copyright is no ordinary chattel, that
the property right conferred by the Copyright Act does not give the copyright
owner exclusive dominion over the thing owned, and that copyright “plainly
implicates a more complex set of property interests than does run-of-the-mill
theft, conversion or fraud.”88 The Dowling Court emphasized the history of
Congress’s measured use of criminal sanctions for copyright infringement,
concluding that Congress did not intend prosecutors to use the Interstate
Transportation of Stolen Property Act, with its harsh penalties, to prosecute
copyright infringers.
In LaMacchia, the court correctly interpreted Dowling as standing for the
proposition that, absent a clear indication from Congress, general criminal laws
should not be used to subvert the “finely calibrated” reach of criminal liability
under the Copyright Act.89 The court held it would not permit the government to
prosecute Mr. LaMacchia for wire fraud when his conduct was not criminal
under the Copyright Act.90 In its concluding paragraph, however, the court took
the opportunity to lobby Congress for change:
This is not, of course, to suggest that there is anything edifying about
what LaMacchia is alleged to have done. If the indictment is to be
believed, one might at best describe his actions as heedlessly
irresponsible, and at worst as nihilistic, self-indulgent, and lacking in any
fundamental sense of values. Criminal as well as civil penalties should
85. Unlike the criminal copyright infringement statute, the mail and wire fraud provisions do not
require proof of a personal profit motive. See LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. at 541-42; see also 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1341, 1343 (1994).
86. 473 U.S. 207 (1985).
87. Id. at 216.
88. Id. at 217-18.
89. LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. at 545.
90. See id. at 542-43.
Washington University Open Scholarship
p835 Loren.doc 02/01/00   5:34 PM
852 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 77:835
probably attach to willful, multiple infringements of copyrighted
software even absent a commercial motive on the part of the infringer.
One can envision ways that the copyright law could be modified to
permit such prosecution. But, “[i]t is the legislature, not the Court which
is to define a crime, and ordain its punishment.”91
The aftermath of LaMacchia brought calls for criminal copyright
infringement reform. Press reports exaggerated the perceived “lawlessness” that
the opinion allegedly endorsed.92 For example, one press story stated: “There’s
no copyright law in cyberspace and computer bandits are free to walk off with
all the software they can carry until Congress does something about it . . . .”93
LaMacchia did not address the application of copyright law in cyberspace, only
the inappropriate use of the wire fraud statute to prosecute what was, at the
time, clearly against the law, but just not a criminal offense.94 The ruling in
LaMacchia, however, did highlight a growing problem: the massive copying of
copyrighted works in digital media.
Unfortunately, the NET Act respresents an overreaction to the LaMacchia
“loophole.” The Act has the potential to encompass the activities of a wide
range of average citizens, making them criminal copyright infringers, and even
felons. In eliminating the requirement of a profit motive, the NET Act makes
possible the parade of horribles that the court in LaMacchia warned against by
criminalizing the conduct of the “myriad of home computer users who succumb
to the temptation to copy even a single software program for private use.”95
Given that the $1,000 threshold created by the NET Act is calculated as a total
over any six month period, it is quite possible that the numerous home computer
91. Id. at 545 (quoting Dowling, 473 U.S. at 214).
92. See Barbara Carton, Judge Drops Charges Against Student Who Ran Service for Software
Pirates, WALL ST. J., Dec. 30, 1994, at B5; Software Unprotected, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Dec. 30,
1994, at A2; Jules Crittenden, Ruling Clears Way for Computer Bandits, BOSTON HERALD, Dec. 30,
1994, at 1.
93. Crittenden, supra note 92.
94. David LaMacchia’s actions clearly constituted copyright infringement. His actions involved the
reproduction and distribution of copyrighted works, perhaps even the public performance and/or public
display of those works. See Mark A. Lemley, Dealing with Overlapping Copyrights on the Internet, 22
U. DAYTON L. REV. 547 (1997). Such actions constitute civil infringement, without regard to why they
are undertaken or the mental state of the actor at the time such actions are undertaken. See 17 U.S.C. §
501 (1994).
95. LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. at 544. The court also noted that the software industry itself, at least
at one point in time, did not desire to make criminals of a large number of consumers of computer
software. Id. at 544 & n.18 (citing 1992 testimony of the Vice-President and General Counsel of the
Computer & Communications Industry Association before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on
Intellectual Property and Judicial Administration).
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users who succumb to this temptation could be classified as criminals.96
B. The More Complex Answers: Digitization and Copyright as
“Property”
The NET Act represents more than just a congressional response to a single
case. Had there not been David LaMacchia, there would have been another
individual facilitating the copying of copyrighted works on a massive scale
without a profit motive.97 More fundamentally, the NET Act is a reaction to the
dual phenomena of the digitization of society and the increasingly prevalent
view of copyrighted works as property just like jewelry, automobiles, and
television sets.98 A case like LaMacchia may have been necessary to convince
Congress that the Copyright Act needed amending, but the reasons
substantiating that need are far more complicated than those presented by one
twenty-one-year-old student from MIT.
1. Digitization
In large measure, the NET Act responsed to the increasing prevalence of
digital technology. Digitization of copyrighted works permits rapid and easy
reproduction and distribution, whether the work is a literary work, musical
work, dramatic work, pictorial or graphic work, motion picture or other
96. See discussion infra Parts III & IV, concerning the possible overbreadth of the NET Act and the
importance of Congress’ retention of the remaining requirement that the infringement be undertaken
“willfully.”
97. In his testimony before Congress, Cary Sherman, Senior Executive Vice President and General
Counsel for the Record Industry Association of America demonstrated to the committee members, with a
slide show, several pirate sites on the World Wide Web, including “Jon’s Take But Don’t Tell Page”
filled with sound files of popular musical works. In his testimony, Mr. Sherman also tried to drive home
for Congress the magnitude of copying now permissible with digital technology and the Internet:
For example, in 1991, 12 counterfeiting operations, employing hundreds of individuals, manufactured
approximately 28 million counterfeit cassettes. Today, one individual, in less time than it takes me to
read this testimony, can send a full-length album to more than 50 million Internet users. As I said, the
rules of the game have radically changed.
The No Electronic Theft (NET) Act, 1997: Hearing on H.R. 2265 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and
Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 146-149 (1997) (statement of
Carey Sherman).
98. See, e.g., The No Electronic Theft (NET) Act, 1997: Hearing on H.R. 2265 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong.
(1997) (statement of Sandra A. Sellers, Vice President, Intellectual Property Education and Enforcement,
Software Publishers Association) (“If one were to walk into a jewelry store, steal some jewels, and then
give them away on the street the thief would probably be prosecuted, despite the fact that he did not gain
financially from his actions. The same should be true with respect to software.”).
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audiovisual work, or sound recording.99 The ease of reproduction and
distribution of digital technology significantly reduces the costs to the copyright
owners for distributing works to consumers. If content providers can fully
embrace this technology, they stand to reap great rewards through cost savings.
Presumably some of those rewards will be passed on to the public through
reduced prices for copyrighted works.
While digitization presents an immense range of new possibilities for
copyright owners, it also has created a crisis in copyright: digitization of a work
permits rapid and easy unauthorized reproduction and distribution.
Unauthorized reproduction and distribution of any significance100 i  the
analogue world are, in large measure, obvious and visible activities, making it
relatively easy to catch any infringer worth catching. Conversely, unauthorized
copying of little significance is not worth the effort of finding, pursuing, and
punishing the culprit. Certainly this is true for many kinds of criminal, and
perhaps for some civil, infringement actions as well. Sometimes, however,
copyright owners have pursued small-scale infringers with allegations of civil
infringement in order to discourage other potential infringers.101
Previously, copyright owners also were protected by the fact that a
significant investment in capital was necessary to engage in infringement on any
kind of a scale that might threaten the copyright owner’s profits. Such an
investment usually correlated with engaging in that activity for financial gain,
thus implicating the criminal sanctions of the Copyright Act. The significant
capital required also meant there existed assets upon which the copyright owner
could levy to satisfy a civil judgement for infringement. This, in turn, meant a
civil judgement for infringement was a real deterrent to those kinds of infringers.
Digital technology, on the other hand, requires little investment in capital in
order to reproduce copyrighted works on a massive scale. The lack of capital
investment necessary creates three major implications for copyright
infringement. First, mass-scale copying may not necessarily be for profit. This
was the major factor leading to the proposal for and passage of the NET Act.
99. These works are all but two of the works of authorship eligible for copyright protection. See 17
U.S.C. § 102 (1994). The two categories of works not included in this example are (1) pantomimes and
choreographic works, and (2) architectural works, although representations of both of these could be
easily digitized as well.
100. By any significance, I mean reproduction and distribution on a scale that threatens to harm the
market for the copyrighted work at an appreciable level.
101. An example of such a case where one has the sense that the litigation is pursued by the plaintiff,
not only to stop the defendant in the case, but to make an example of that defendant as a means of
deterring others is Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communication Services, Inc., 923
F. Supp. 1231 (N.D.Cal 1995).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol77/iss3/3
p835 Loren.doc 02/01/00   5:34 PM
1999] CRIMINAL COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT 855
Second, the lack of capital required also means that mass-scale digital
copying may not involve any kind of calculated decision required for mass-scale
analog copying. Millions of individuals, because they own a computer which is
connected to the Internet, have the immediate capacity to engage in mass scale
copying without much thought for the consequences of such actions. This reality
may mean that the net of criminal infringement has now been cast too wide,
catching within it otherwise innocent individuals, an issue explored in Part III of
this article.
Finally, the low level of capital investment needed for mass-scale copying
leads to a situation where people engaged in non-commercially motivated
infringement, like David LaMacchia, are often judgement proof.102 At least
when an investment in capital was required, an infringer would possess assets
on which a copyright owner could levy to satisfy a civil judgement or which
would be lost if criminal infringement were found.103 In the case of digital
copying, the threat of civil liability may not be enough of a deterrent.104 Yet th
damage done by non-commercially motivated infringers can equal and
sometimes surpass the damage done by infringers engaged in reproduction and
distribution for financial gain. Criminal sanctions, it is hoped, will deter this
type of mass-scale infringement.
The content industry pointed to their fear of massive unauthorized
reproduction of copyrighted works, based on the reality of what was occurring
with digital technology, as the main reason for not fully embracing this
technology. Congress and the Administration had clearly demonstrated that they
wanted to encourage the growth of digital technology and its use throughout
society.105 An important aspect in encouraging that growth was assuring that
sufficient content in digital form existed. The established content industries
assured Congress that without increased copyright protections, digital
102. While these defendants may not have the assets to satisfy the judgement at the time of its entry,
there is authority suggesting that a judgement for willful copyright infringement is not dischargeable in
bankruptcy, meaning that the judgement would follow the infringers for the rest of their lives. See In re
Pineau, 149 B.R. 239 (D. Maine 1993); In re Massier, 51 B.R. 229 (D. Co. 1985).
103. See 17 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1994) (requiring a judgement of conviction to order the forfeiture and
destruction or other disposition of not only all infringing copies, but also all the equipment used in the
manufacture of such infringing copies).
104. See The No Electronic Theft (NET) Act, 1997: Hearing on H.R. 2265 Before the Subcomm.
on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1997)
(statement of Cary H. Sherman, Senior Executive Vice President, Recording Industry Association of
America).
105. See THE WHITE PAPER, supra note 14, at 11; see also S. REP. NO. 105-190 (1998) (additional
views of Sen. Leahy).
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technology and the global information infrastructure would grow at a much
slower speed.106
Congress confronted the phenomenon of the Internet, and consistent with the
maximalist trend in copyright law, strengthened the rights of copyright owners
by fortifying the imaginary walls. However, the following questions are
certainly worth asking: is our public policy in the copyright area being held
hostage by the publishing, music, motion picture, and computer software
industries, and does our copyright law need to provide incentives that include
the ability to have criminal sanctions imposed on non-commercially motivated
infringers in return for the services offered by the content industry? Prior to the
proliferation of digital technology, the public needed publishers and record
companies for their reproduction and distribution services. With digital projects,
these tasks can now be performed by much smaller companies and even
individuals because a large investment of capital is no longer required. Since the
ultimate aim of copyright law is to promote knowledge and learning, perhaps
the widespread adoption of digital technology may require a drastic rethinking
of copyright law.107
2. Copyright as “Ordinary Chattel”
In addition to the pressure exerted on existing copyright law by digital
technology, the increasing tendency to view copyright as “property” also
contributed to the passage of the NET Act. Copyright falls within the ambit of
“intellectual property,” or property of the mind, and many view copyright as
property.108 Others insist that copyright is not property at all, but rather is a
106. See, e.g., The No Electronic Theft (NET) Act, 1997: Hearing on H.R. 2265 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong.
(1997) (statement of Mr. Berman); see also note 13 and accompanying text. The call for increased
protection is consistent with the maximalist trend in copyright throughout copyright’s history. The United
States has consistently increased the protection afforded to copyright owners, and has rarely, if ever,
decreased the protection of copyrighted works in favor of increased public use or access to those works.
107. This inquiry is clearly beyond the scope of this article. Several interesting ideas regarding a new
way to achieve this goal have been proposed. See generally Jessica Litman, Revising Copyright Law for
the Information Age, 75 OR. L. REV. 19, 41 (1996) (suggesting that a possible way to revise our
copyright law is to have the right of commercial exploitation as the basic right of a copyright owner); John
Perry Barlow, The Economy of Ideas: A Framework for Rethinking Patents and Copyrights in the
Digital Age (Everything You Know About Intellectual Property Is Wrong), WIRED, Mar. 1994, at 84;
Jessica Litman, New Copyright Paradigms (visited Oct. 22, 1999)
<http://www.msen.com/~litman/paradigm.htm>.
108. See, e.g., THE WHITE PAPER, supra note 14, at 205 (1996) (suggesting that the concepts of
copyright can be taught to children because they can “relate to the underlying notions of property—what is
‘mine’ versus what is ‘not mine,’ just as they do for a jacket, a ball, or a pencil”).
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limited statutory monopoly.109 The Supreme Court has made clear that
copyright is a limited statutory monopoly granted by Congress pursuant to the
Constitution and not a natural law right of the creator of a work.110 The debate
between copyright as a natural law right or a limited statutory monopoly has
raged for centuries.111 The Lockean conception of a copyrighted work as an
extension of oneself embodies the notion that the creator should have a property
right in all that is created.112 The copyright laws of many European nations
clearly stem from a notion of the creators’ natural law property right.113 Thus,
increased international harmonization may explain the rising prevalence of the
view in the United States that copyright is “just like” other forms of tangible
personal property.114
Whether the term “property” is used or not, copyright possesses unique
attributes, unlike other forms of property. One of the most salient aspects of
copyright is that, unlike tangible property, the public’s interest is paramount, not
the interests of the property owner, i.e., the copyright owner.115 As with other
forms of public goods, copyrighted works are characterized by non-rivalrous
“By passing this legislation, we send a strong message that we value intellectual property, as abstract and
arcane as it may be, in the same way that we value the real and personal property of our citizens. Just as
we will not tolerate the theft of software, CD’s, books, or movie cassettes from a store, so will we not
permit the stealing of intellectual property over the Internet.”
143 CONG. REC. S12,689-S12,691 (1997) (statement in support of passage of the NET Act by Sen.
Leahy), see also 143 CONG. REC. H9883 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1997) (statement of Representative Coble in
support of the NET Act, indicating that “the public must come to understand that intellectual property
rights, while abstract and arcane, are no less deserving of protection than personal or real property rights”).
109. See, e.g., Lydia Pallas Loren, Redefining the Market Failure Approach to Fair Use in an Era
of Copyright Permission Systems, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 5 n.12 (1997); L. Ray Patterson, Copyright
and “The Exclusive Right” of Authors, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 37-41 (1993) (noting that copyright
“wears the property label uneasily” and is more regulatory in nature). As the Supreme Court has
recognized, “[t]he copyright owner . . . holds no ordinary chattel.” Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S.
207, 216 (1985).
110. See Dowling, 473 U.S. at 216.
111. See, e.g., GRANTLAND RICE, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AUTHORSHIP IN AMERICA 77 (1997)
(noting that outside of slavery there was no greater debate for writers in the antebellum America than the
issue of an author’s rights in literary property); see also Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-
Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J.
1533 (1993); Alfred Yen, Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession, 51 OHIO ST.
L. REV. 517 (1990).
112. See Lloyd L. Weinreb, Copyright for Functional Expression, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1149, 1222-
29 (1998).
113. See Margaret Chon, Postmodern “Progress”: Reconsidering the Copyright and Patent
Power, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 97 (1993).
114. See infra note 120 and accompanying text.
115. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) (recognizing that
“[t]he primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but ‘[t]o promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts’”).
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use.116 Another distinguishing feature of the “property” of a copyrighted work is
that its value improves with use.117
Despite copyright’s non-property attributes, there appears to be an
increasing use of the label “property” for copyright. The significance of this
trend for criminal copyright infringement is, of course, that the more copyright
is viewed as property, the more any kind of copying of a copyrighted work looks
like theft. Generally, stealing, regardless of its motive, is wrong.118 Even when
one steals for non-commercial purposes, the law still punishes that person.
Because underlying ethical concepts shape criminal law,119 when  copyright is
considered property, any copying begins to look morally or ethically wrong and
therefore deserving of criminal sanctions. Even the title of the NET Act bears
this out: The No Electronic Theft Act.120
The common law crime of larceny traditionally required the prosecution to
prove a “trespassory taking and carrying away of the personal property of
another with intent to steal the same.”121 In attempting to apply these common
law principles122 to the theft of intangible property, such as copyright, there are
a few obvious problems. First, a defendant cannot “carry away” intangible
116. Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of “Rights
Management,” 97 MICH. L. REV. 462, 502 (1998).
117. See Peter Jaszi, Caught in the Net of Copyright, 75 OR. L. REV. 299, 300 (1996). Physical
property, on the other hand, degrades with use. An extreme way in which the value of a copyrighted work
increases with use involves network effects, where the value of a work to a user of the work increases as
others use the same work. See Mark Lemly & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network
Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479 (1998).
118. Our criminal laws do make some exceptions for theft of property in exigent circumstances. For
example, criminal law generally recognizes a defense of duress or necessity in certain exceptional
circumstances. Self-defense or defense of others or property may also sometimes provide a defense from
criminal conviction. See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW ch. 5
(2d ed. 1986).
119. See, e.g., Francis Bows Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARV. L. REV. 974, 988 (1932).
120. The legislative history makes it clear that members of Congress sought to treat copyright “just
like” other examples of personal property:
By passing this legislation, we send a strong message that we value intellectual property, as abstract and
arcane as it may be, in the same way that we value the real and personal property of our citizens. Just as
we will not tolerate the theft of software, CD’s, books, or movie cassettes from a store, so will we not
permit the stealing of intellectual property over the Internet.
143 CONG. REC. S12,689-S12,691 (1997) (statement in support of passage of the NET Act by Sen.
Leahy); see also 143 CONG. REC. H9884 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1997) (statement of Representative Coble in
support of the NET Act, indicating that “the public must come to understand that intellectual property
rights, while abstract and arcane, are no less deserving of protection than personal or real property rights”).
121. ROLLIN M. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 234 (2d ed. 1969).
122. The Model Penal Code uses the term “theft” as opposed to “larceny.” MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 223 (1962). Theft of movable property requires that a person “takes, or exercises unlawful control over,
movable property of another with purpose to deprive him thereof.” Id. § 223.2. “Deprive” is defined as
requiring a withholding of property, either permanently or for an extended period. Id. § 223.0.
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property. While a defendant may carry away copies embodying the copyrighted
work, such as books, CDs, or computer disks, one cannot “carry away” the
work itself.123 Second, at common law, proving “intent to steal” required
showing that the defendant had the intent to deprive the possessor permanently
of his property.124 Committing an act of infringement, for example, by copying
a copyrighted work, does not permanently deprive the copyright owner of her
“property.”
Because of the intangible nature of copyright, it is impossible to have a
trespassory taking or permanent deprivation. Infringing copyright, however,
does invade the rights granted to copyright owners by the Copyright Act. This
invasion is much clearer when the infringement is undertaken for financial gain
because the infringer appears to be reaping profits that would otherwise be
realized by the copyright owner. When the infringer is not commercially
benefitting from the activity, however, there remains an invasion of the rights
granted by statute but such actions are not widely accepted in society as being
morally or ethically wrong. With non-commercially motivated infringement the
essence of the right of a copyright owner, the right to profit from the
copyrighted work, does not appear to be invaded.
An appropriate parallel in the law of theft of tangible property may be the
temporary theft of an automobile, an act sometimes referred to as “joyriding.”125
The law recognizes that despite the lack of intent to permanently deprive the
owner of the automobile of its use, the temporary interference with the property
ownership of the automobile is still a form of theft.126The ssence of the right of
a property owner, permanent possession of the property, is not invaded by
joyriding, but the possessory interest still has been interfered with. Non-
commercially motivated copyright infringement is similar to joyriding in that the
infringer does not exercise what might be considered the essence of what a
copyright owner possesses—the right to profit127 from the copyrighted work.128
123. The distinction between the copyrighted work and copies or phonorecords embodying the work
is so critical that it is codified in the statute. 17 U.S.C. § 202 (1994).
124. PERKINS, supra note 121, at 266-67.
125. “Joyriding” is a non-legal term used to describe the unauthorized taking of a motor vehicle for a
brief period of time without intent to permanently deprive the owner of possession. The offense is
classified as a misdemeanor in some jurisdictions, and as a felony in others. See B. Finberg, Annotation,
Automobiles: Elements of Offenses Defined in “Joyriding” Statutes, 9 A.L.R. 3d §§ 633-34 (1967).
126. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-1a-1314 (1998); OR. REV. STAT. § 164.135 (1997); MODEL
PENAL CODE § 223.9 (1962).
127. The Model Penal Code reflects this focus on the economic value of tangible property when it
provides that the requisite intent to deprive someone of their property must be either an intent to withhold
the property permanently or “for so extended a period as to appropriate a major portion of its economic
value.” MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.0 (1962).
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Yet a fundamental distinction exists between stealing a car, even simply to
joyride, and making a copy of a copyrighted work for one’s friends. Joyriding
deprives the owner of the automobile of the use of the vehicle, even if only
temporarily. Copying a copyrighted work does not deprive the copyright owner
of the use of that work. Non-commercially motivated infringement may not even
deprive the copyright owner of revenue the copyright owner might otherwise
receive.
Individuals who commit copyright infringement without a commercial
motive often believe that what they are doing is not theft. They believe that the
person who copies a copyrighted work for free never would have purchased a
copy anyway. Because they could not afford to, or for some other reason they
would not have purchased a copy, the free copy they received does not decrease
the profits realized by the copyright owner.129 This, of course, is the problem
with so-called theft of intangibles. Just because one person makes a “free” copy
of the work does not mean that the copyright owner has been commercially
harmed.
But what about the type of non-commercially motivated mass-scale copying
facilitated by individuals like David LaMacchia? Viewing copyright as
property, commentators refer to these individuals as “pirates,”130 neglecting the
fact that they are not seeking to profit from their activities, whereas true pirates
engage in their activities for financial reward.131 The individuals who commit
non-commercially motivated yet massive copying on the Internet often have a
Robin Hood complex. They believe they are giving to the “poor” by permitting
access to works that not all users can afford or permitting access to works that
they believe are only sold at ridiculously inflated prices.132 Rob n Hood,
however, gave to the poor by stealing from the rich. In the context of electronic
128. Of course, to be criminal the copying would need to be classified as willful, see infra Section IV,
and the total retail value of the copies made in any six month period would need to be more than $1,000.
See infra Section IV; see also 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) (Supp. III 1997).
129. See Spanner, supra note 37, at 6-8.
130. See, e.g., Timothy D. Howell, Comment, Intellectual Property Pirates: Congress Raises the
Stakes in the Modern Battle to Protect Copyrights and Safeguard the United States Economy, 27 ST.
MARY’S L.J. 613, 643-44 (1996).
131. See GEORGE WOODBURY, THE GREAT DAYS OF PIRACY IN THE WEST INDIES 11 (1951)
(“Piracy as practiced in the classical period was principally a matter of ransom. . . .”). The use of the term
“pirates” in the context of copying in digital media, particularly reproductions made and distributed over
the Internet, may also be the result of the general notion of the Internet as a new frontier. Pirates often
thought of themselves as belonging to an “adventurous, often outlaw, breed that gravitates toward all
frontiers . . . .” Id.
132. See Spanner, supra note 37, at 8; John Gibeaut, Zapping Cyberpiracy, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1997, at
60.
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reproduction of copyrighted works, these modern-day Robin Hoods believe that
no theft or harm occurs because the owner of the copyrighted work is not denied
the use or benefits of the copyright.133 Yet with this type of non-commercially
motivated mass-scale copying, harm still occurs in the lost sales that might have
been realized had the infringing copies not been distributed.
The combined impact of digitization and the view of copyright as “just like”
any other kind of property has resulted in the casting of a much wider net for
criminal infringement. Certainly, mass-scale copying should be halted. But
given the underlying goals of copyright, have we reached too far with the NET
Act? The remaining sections of this article explore that question.
III. DOES THE NET ACT CAST THE NET OF CRIMINAL COPYRIGHT
INFRINGEMENT TOO WIDE?
In urging passage of the NET Act, Senator Hatch described the Act as
prohibiting “willful, commercial-scale pirating of copyrighted works . . . .”134
Yet, as discussed above, the numerical and retail value thresholds set by the
NET Act to define criminal infringement are minimal and far lower than
necessary to encompass “commercial-scale” copying. In the past, copyright had
been an area in which Congress chose to tread cautiously, relying primarily on
civil remedies to provide protection against infringement, while mandating
“studiously graded penalties” in those instances where Congress concluded that
the deterrent effect of criminal sanctions was required.135 “This step-by-step,
carefully considered approach [was] consistent with Congress’ traditional
sensitivity to the special concerns implicated by the copyright laws.”136 These
special concerns include the ability of the public to access information, allowing
the public to use the underlying facts and ideas contained in a work, and the
inherent tension with the values embodied in the First Amendment that are
present when people are given a monopoly over expressive works.
After the LaMacchia decision, the Criminal Copyright Improvement Act of
1995 was proposed.137 Described by one commentator as a “cautious and
133. See Catherine Therese Clarke, From CrimINet to Cyber-Perp: Toward an Inclusive Approach
to Policing the Evolving Criminal Mens Rea on the Internet, 75 OR. L. REV. 191, 216 n.109 (1996)
(citing an interview with Jeffrey Schiller, Manger of Systems and Operations of M.I.T. Distributed
Computing and Network Services).
134. 143 CONG. REC. S12,689 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997) (statement in support of passage of the
NET Act by Sen. Hatch).
135. Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207, 221, 225 (1985).
136. Id. at 225.
137. See S. 1122, 104th Cong. (1995); 141 CONG. REC. 11,452-54 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995)
Washington University Open Scholarship
p835 Loren.doc 02/01/00   5:34 PM
862 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 77:835
measured attempt to expand the protection afforded under the current copyright
system,”138 the proposed act would have set the monetary threshold for non-
commercially motivated criminal infringement at $5,000, five times higher than
the NET Act that was eventually passed.139 Th  felony threshold would have
required a retail value in excess of $10,000, four times that set by the NET
Act.140 As late as July of 1997, the threshold for non-commercially motivated
infringement in the proposed legislation remained at a minimum of ten copies
and a total retail value of $5,000.141 As part of an en bloc amendment by the
Judiciary Committee, the thresholds were reduced to one copy and $1,000.142
The reason given for this reduction was the Department of Justice’s belief that it
would want to pursue some actions involving infringements that did not meet the
higher thresholds.143
Throughout the various revisions to the criminal provisions of the copyright
law in the last two decades, even industry representatives have acknowledged
that copyright law should not “be accidentally taking a large percentage of the
American people, either small business or citizens, into the gray area of the
criminal law.”144 Congress has been urged repeatedly to carefully draft
copyright laws in a manner calculated to avoid criminalizing the daily activities
of millions of people.145 At various times industry representatives have also
expressed concern that the felony provisions might be misapplied to ordinary
business disputes and situations involving reverse engineering.146
Until 1997, Congress had “acted with exceeding caution” in expanding the
(statement of Sen. Leahy) (noting that this bill was specifically tailored toward preventing another
LaMacchia.).
138. Howell, supra note 130, at 645.
139. The $5,000 threshhold was also supported by the Clinton Administration in its White Paper. See
THE WHITE PAPER, supra note 14, at 229.
140. See S. 1122, 104th Cong. § 2(B)-(D).
141. See S. 1044, 105th Cong. § 2 (1997).
142. See H.R. REP. NO. 105-339 (1997).
143. See id. This is a stance seen frequently in federal law. Prosecutors seek broad statutory definition
of criminal conduct and urge Congress to rely on prosecutorial discretion to not apply the statute as
broadly as it is worded.
144. Hearings on S. 893 Before the House Judiciary Subcom. on Intellectual Property and
Judicial Admin. on the 1992 Amendments to the Copyright Act, 102d Cong. at 65 (Aug. 12, 1992)
(Congressional testimony of the Vice President and General Counsel of the Computer & Communications
Industry of America) (cited in United States v. LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. 535, 544-45 n.8 (D. Mass.
1994)).
145. See Howell, supra note 130, at 649.
146. See, e.g., Criminal Sanctions for Violation of Software Copyright, 1992: Hearings on S. 893
Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Property and Judicial Admin. of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 102d Cong. (1991).
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reach of criminal copyright infringement.147 Co gress appears to have thrown
that caution to the wind with the passage of the NET Act. Even supporters, as
they urged passage of the Act, feared that its scope might be too broad.148
Despite recognizing this danger, Senator Hatch was persuaded to support the
bill “because of the severity of the potential losses to copyright owners from
widespread LaMacchia-like behavior and the little time remaining in the
session.”149
The potential overbreadth of the NET Act can be examined by exploring the
possible types of activities that might reach the numerical thresholds that make
non-commercially motivated infringement a crime. The example given earlier of
an individual who makes one copy of a high-end computer program to complete
work on their home computer is but one way to easily reach the $1,000
threshold.150 In order to fully analyze whether the NET Act has cast the net of
criminal infringement too wide, three examples of non-commercially motivated
activities are described and analyzed below.
A. Hypotheticals
1. Janet is a sales representative for a small pharmaceutical company. She
has over 100 different customers to whom she markets the company’s product.
Janet occasionally reads medical articles that she believes her customers might
find useful. In January, she sent copies of two such articles to twenty customers,
and in April she sent copies of two different articles to another twenty
customers. If the articles each have a value of $12.50 or more, Janet’s copies
meet the threshold for criminal liability.151 If the value of each article is $31.25,
her copies meet both the number of copies threshold and the total retail value
threshold for felony classification.152 F r medical journal articles, such retail
values are not unusual.153
147. See Dowling, 473 U.S. at 221.
148. See 143 CONG. REC. S12,689 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997) (statement in support of passage of the
NET Act by Sen. Hatch) (expressing concern that “the language was so broad that the net could be cast
too widely . . . so that minor offenders or persons who honestly believed that they had a legitimate right to
engage in the behavior prohibited by the bill would be swept in”).
149. Id.
150. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
151. Janet sent a total of 80 copies. To meet the threshold for criminal liability the articles would
need to have a retail value of only $12.50 each ($1,000 ÷ 80 = $12.50).
152. The thresholds for felony classification are more than ten copies and a total retail value of more
than $2,500. Thus, because more than ten copies were made, the felony level would be met if each of the
articles had a retail value of $31.25 ($2,500 ÷ 80 = $31.25).
153. For example, the copyright notice in the JOURNAL OF PHARMACY AND PHARMACOLOGY states
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2. Jim participates in several Internet e-mail listservs154 focused on popular
music. Over the last four months, Jim posted three different messages to one of
these lists, called RETROMUSIC, in which he typed the complete lyrics to
three songs written by the rock group Devo, along with his own analysis of the
messages contained in the lyrics. More than 500 people subscribe to the
RETROMUSIC list. Because of the way an e-mail listserv works,155 each
subscriber automatically received copies of Jim’s messages. If a court were to
accept that all 1,500 copies of the lyrics should be considered for purposes of
determining the total retail value of the infringement, and if each individual lyric
had a value of only $.67, the criminal infringement threshold would be met. A
retail value of only $1.67 would be needed to raise the total retail value
sufficiently to meet the felony threshold. For song lyrics, these values are
actually quite low.
3. Finally, consider Jason, a professor of law at a public university. Jason
teaches intellectual property to a class of ninety students. Over the course of one
semester, there were three important intellectual property cases argued before
the Supreme Court. Jason passed out summaries of the arguments prepared by
a large publisher of legal periodicals. In less than 180 days Jason reproduced
and distributed 270 copies of copyrighted works. If the value of each copy
exceeds $3.70, the criminal liability threshold has been met, with a value of only
$9.26 needed to meet the felony threshold. Again, these values are by no means
out of the realm of possibilities.156
As these hypotheticals illustrate, the $1,000 total retail value is extremely
that authorization to make photocopies for internal or personal use is granted provided that a base fee of
$15 per article is paid to the Copyright Clearance Center. See, e.g., 51 J. PHARMACY & PHARMACOLOGY,
Sept. 1999, at title page. The per-copy fee for THE JOURNAL OF PHYSIOLOGY is $12.50. See, e.g., 512 J.
OF PHYSIOLOGY, ii (1998).
154. A listserv is a broad term that describes generally a software program that permits people to
subscribe to and unsubscribe from mailing lists. See generally CONSTANCE HALE, WIRED STYLE:
PRINCIPLES OF ENGLISH USAGE IN THE DIGITAL AGE 50 (1996).
155. A listserv is used to distribute electronic mail to all members whose addresses appear on a
particular mailing list. Mailing lists exist for any number of specific or general interests of a subscriber. A
listserv provides an efficient means of communication between members on a list because the single
posting of an e-mail to a list automatically results in multiple copies being sent to all those on the list. See
generally MARTIN GAY & KATHLYN GAY, THE INFORMATION SUPERHIGHWAY 63 (1996).
156. For example, the Bureau of National Affairs (“BNA”) routinely publishes summaries of
Supreme Court oral arguments. The BNA reporter for intellectual property, the Patent, Trademark &
Copyright Journal, contains a copyright notice which permits reproductions only if the subscriber is
registered with the Copyright Clearance Center and pays the $1.00 per page per copy fee (emphasis
added). See, e.g., 56 Patent, Trademark & Copyright Journal (BNA) No. 1383, at 269 (July 2, 1998). If
each of the summaries which Jason copied were a mere four pages long, the copies he made would have
exceeded the $1,000 threshold (270 x 4 x $1.00 = $1,080).
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easy to reach and the felony level of $2,500 is not that difficult either. Is it really
as bad as this? Are Janet, Jim, and Jason criminals? Or worse yet, are they
felons? Has Congress set the net of criminal copyright liability too wide? For
each of these scenarios, three factors should be considered in determining if
criminal copyright law has reached too far: (1) proving infringement for non-
commercially motivated activities; (2) prosecutorial discretion; and (3) proving
that the defendant willfully infringed. The first two of these factors are discussed
below, while the final factor is explored in the final section of this article.
B. Limits on the Scope of the NET
1. Infringement
In order to be liable for criminal infringement, the conduct must constitute
infringement. While this may seem elemental, many comments made about the
impact of the NET Act indicate ignorance on this point. Some criticized the Act
for not including a fair use exemption.157 Yet in order to prove its case against a
criminal defendant, the government would need to prove infringement. Proving
infringement in a criminal case requires negating certain defenses, including a
claim of fair use. While in a civil context the burden is on the defendant to prove
fair use,158 in the criminal context fair use is a negativing defense. A negativing
defense prevents the prosecution from proving an element of the crime. Since
criminal infringement requires proof that the defendant infringed and the
Copyright Act provides that a fair use is “not an infringement of copyright,”159
the burden is on the government to prove that the defendant’s use is not a fair
use.
Prior to the passage of the NET Act, an argument often asserted to defend a
charge of criminal infringement was that the copies distributed were subject to a
valid “first sale.” One of the limitations on the right granted to copyright owners
157. See, e.g., Wendy M. Grossman, Cyber View: Downloading As a Crime, SCI. AM., Mar. 1998,
at 37. Perhaps those criticizing the act had reviewed the criminal provisions of the 1909 Copyright Act.
While the criminal provisions of the 1909 Act did expressly contain exemptions for non-profit groups,
Copyright Act of Mar. 4, 1909, § 28, 54 Stat. 1075, 1082 (codified and amended as § 104), the 1976
Act no longer included those exemptions in the criminal infringement provision. 17 U.S.C. app. § 506
(1976). The reason for this, however, is not that the exemptions no longer existed, but that the 1976 Act
codified fair use as a right granted to users notwithstanding the rights granted to copyright owners. Prior to
the 1976 Act, the right of fair use was a judicial doctrine. Thus, the express exemption from criminal
liability for non-profit activity was clearly understandable in the 1909 Act but unneccessary under the
1976 Act.
158. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994).
159. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
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to publicly distribute a copyrighted work is the first sale doctrine. The
Copyright Act provides that the owner of a lawfully made copy is entitled to sell
or otherwise dispose of that copy without violating the distribution right of the
copyright owner.160 Several courts have ruled that when the criminal offense
alleged is the distribution of unauthorized copies, the government is required to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the copies had not been subject to a valid
first sale.161 Now that non-commercial uses have been brought within the scope
of criminal infringement, whether the use at issue is a fair use will become an
important issue in many criminal prosecutions.
The assertion of the fair use defense will be quite common when the
defendant is not engaged in the alleged infringing conduct for commercial
advantage or private financial gain because under the fair use provisions of the
Copyright Act,162 the Supreme Court has held that a non-commercial use is
presumptively a fair use.163 As with the first sale issue, when a defendant asserts
fair use in a criminal case the burden should be on the government to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the use at issue is not a fair use. The fair use
analysis is complicated, involving an examination of four statutory factors on a
case-by-case basis. Often, who has the burden of proof regarding fair use can
determine the outcome.164 Not only is the burden of proof placed on the
government in a criminal case, but the burden involves overcoming the
presumption that a non-commercial use is a fair use.165
In addition to examining whether the use at issue is for commercial or non-
commercial purposes, courts examine the nature of the copyrighted work that is
alleged to have been infringed, the amount and substantiality of the portion of
that work that has been used by the defendant in relation to the work as a whole,
160. See 17 U.S.C. § 109 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
161. See United States v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180, 1188, 1194 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Atherton, 561 F.2d 747 (9th Cir. 1977). In Wise, the court ruled that not only did the government need to
show that there had been no valid first sale but that it also had to prove that the defendant knew the copies
had not been the subject of a valid first sale. Wise, 550 F.2d at 1188, 1194. The proof required concerning
a defendant’s knowledge is discussed infra at Part IV.
One court characterized the first sale issue as a defense but held that if the defendant presented any
evidence that the copies were legally made and that she owned them then “the burden shifts to the
government to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the pertinent copies were either not legally
made or not owned by the defendant.” United States v. Goss, 803 F.2d 638, 644 (11th Cir. 1986).
162. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
163. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449 (1984). Additionally,
just because a defendant is engaging in an activity for profit does not mean that the use at issue is not a fair
use. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
164. Loren, supra note 109, at 44-45.
165. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 449.
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and the effect of the use on the market for, or value of, the copyrighted work.166
These four statutory fair use factors are not exclusive. Courts can consider
additional factors as well.167 In the fair use analysis there are no bright line
rules.168 Each assertion of fair use is to be judged on a case- by-case basis.169
This provides flexibility within the law, but it also reduces the predictability of
whether any particular use will be found to be a fair use.170
The three hypotheticals presented above are illustrative of the
unpredictability in applying the fair use analysis. Janet’s photocopying of
articles was not undertaken with a purpose to sell those copies, thus one might
legitimately think that this use would not be characterized as commercial in a
fair use analysis. However, she did send the articles to customers in hopes of
increasing her sales indirectly. A court could view her conduct as commercial in
nature, thus weighing against a finding of fair use.171 In Janet’s case, the nature
of the copyrighted work is scientific and scholarly. While scholarly and
scientific publications are protected by copyright law, courts will sometimes
allow greater latitude in the uses allowed for those types of works.172
Additionally, Janet might believe that because she copied only one article out of
the entire journal that the amount copied was a small portion. But typically,
166. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994). The fair use doctrine in copyright law is extremely complex. Entire
books and countless law review articles have been written discussing various aspects of the doctrine and
case law. See, e.g., WILLIAM F. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW (2d ed. 1995).
167. A court’s ability to consider factors beyond the four listed in section 107 is indicated by
Congress’ use of the word “include” to introduce those factors. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994). The Copyright
Act expressly defines the word “include” to be “illustrative and not limitative.” 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
168. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577.
169. Id.
170. The lack of predictability in fair use analysis is readily apparent. For example, each of the three
major fair use cases that have reached the Supreme Court have involved a decision by the Court reversing
the holding of the Court of Appeals which had, in turn, reversed a district court. See Campbell v. Acuff-
Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539
(1985); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). This kind of flip-
flopping on appeal can also be seen in another recent fair use case that was heard en banc by the Sixth
Circuit. In Princeton University Press v. Michigan Document Services, the district court held that the
use at issue was infringement and not fair use. Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., 855 F.
Sup. 905 (E.D. Mich. 1994). A panel of the Sixth Circuit held the use to be a fair use and therefore not
infringement. Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., Inc., 1996 WL 54741 (6th Cir. 1996).
Finally, in an en banc decision the Sixth Circuit held the use to be infringement and not fair use, with five
judges dissenting in three separate dissenting opinions. Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document
Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1392 (6th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
171. See American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding the
photocopying by research scientists for personal use at a for-profit company was a commercial use and not
a fair use) cert. dismissed, 116 S. Ct. 592 (1995).
172. See id. at 925.
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each article is viewed as a separate work.173 Therefore, Janet photocopied the
entire copyrighted work, which normally weighs against a finding of fair use.174
The final fair use factor is the impact of the use on the market for the
copyrighted work. Janet might believe that photocopies of individual articles do
not impact the sale of individual journals or journal subscriptions, and this
factor, therefore, weighs in her favor. However, journals typically license for a
fee the right to photocopy individual articles. At least two courts have
recognized the lost licensing fees for photocopying portions of works as a
market harm that weighs heavily against a finding of fair use.175 Despite the
inappropriate use of this circular reasoning,176 the lost licensing fees argument
contributed significantly to a finding of infringement in both of those cases.177
Even if the burden is on the government to disprove fair use, there may be
enough evidence for a court to find that Janet’s actions constitute
infringement.178
Jim’s posting of lyrics from the rock group Devo may fare somewhat better
under fair use analysis.179 Jim’s posting does not raise any inference of
commercial use, thus favoring a finding of fair use based on the presumption of
fairness to which non-commercial uses are entitled.180 Tha  the purpose for
Jim’s posting was to comment on the lyrics also weighs in favor of a finding of
fair use.181 The nature of the work allegedly infringed, however, weighs against
a finding of fair use because music lyrics could be said to be near the core of
copyright’s protection and thus entitled to greater protection. Additionally, Jim
copied the entire expressive work which also weighs against a finding of fair
173. See id. at 926.
174. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 449-50.
175. See Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs, Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1391 (6th Cir.
1996) (en banc); American Geophysical Union, 60 F.3d at 931.
176. This reasoning is circular because the license fee would not need to be paid if the use at issue
were a fair use. Thus, in determining whether the use is a fair use, consideration of lost license fees
assumes that the use is unfair and thus the license fee should have been paid. See Loren, supra note 109,
at 38-41.
177. See supra note 175.
178. While a view of this use as infringement may upset some, it is supported by the decision in
American Geophysical Union, 60 F.3d at 917.
179. While those who use lyrics may think Jim’s activity must certainly be a fair use, representatives
of those who hold the copyright in those lyrics believe copying even a few lyrics in cyberspace is illegal.
Lyrics Lawsuit, BILLBOARD, Feb. 6, 1999 (quoting Edward Murphy, President of the National Music
Publishers’ Association).
180. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 449.
181. Generally, fair use is more likely to be found when the use by the defendant can be said to be
transformative, using the pre-existing work in a way that creates a new work. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at
579. Transformative uses, however, can also be seen as derivative works not entitled to fair use protection.
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use. The copyright owner could argue that Jim did not need to duplicate the
entire lyrics in order to make his comments.182 Finally, the fourth factor may
also weigh against a finding of fair use if the court is willing to accept the lost
licensing fee argument, especially given the number of copies potentially
distributed by Jim.183 If however, the burden is on the government to prove
infringement beyond a reasonable doubt, it may well be that the evidence is
insufficient to deem Jim’s postings an infringement.
Jason’s reproductions for his class also do not clearly represent fair use.
Jason may believe that because he is making multiple copies for classroom use,
a use specifically mentioned in the fair use provision of the Copyright Act, his
action must be fair use.184 Unfortunately for Jason, his use exceeds the
classroom guidelines that are part of the legislative history to the 1976 Act.185
These guidelines, while not part of the law,186 have been used by courts to help
guide them in the amorphous fair use analysis.187 The licensing fees lost by the
copyright owner in this instance could also play a role in determining whether
Jason’s use is fair use.188 Alternatively, a court could view the use by Jason, a
professor, in making multiple copies for classroom use, to be a fair use when no
182. See id. (explaining that in parody, one is entitled to use only so much as is necessary to conjure
up the original work that is the subject of the parody).
183. In the context of lyrics distributed over the Internet, a Swiss lyric web site was shut down by the
National Association of Music Publishers upon allegations of both civil and criminal copyright
infringement. Swiss authorities seized the computer equipment hosting the web site where users from
around the world had been posting their favorite song lyrics. Adam Sweeting, Charlatan’s Web: Lyrics
on the Internet—Reference Tool or Felony? THE GUARDIAN, Feb. 12, 1999.
184. Section 107 begins with a statement of what are sometimes referred to as “illustrative” fair uses:
“criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use),
scholarship, or research.” 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994) (emphasis added). These illustrative uses, however, are
not always fair use. The four factors must still be examined in any given case.
185. AGREEMENT ON GUIDELINES FOR CLASSROOM COPYING IN NOT-FOR-PROFIT EDUCATIONAL
INSTITUTIONS WITH RESPECT TO BOOKS AND PERIODICALS, H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 68-71 (1976)
[hereinafter, THE CLASSROOM GUIDELINES].
186. THE CLASSROOM GUIDELINES were developed by an ad hoc committee representing various
interest groups and became part of a committee report upon submission by the ad hoc committee. See
Jessica Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 857, 875-77
(1987). While the ad hoc committee did include some representatives of the education community, the
guidelines themselves were opposed by major groups representing higher education. See H.R. REP. NO.
94-1476 at 72 (1976) (noting strong opposition from the American Association of University Professors
and the Association of American Law Schools).
187. Although the guidelines purport to “state the minimum and not the maximum standards of
educational fair use,” courts have effectively turned them into the extent of permissible copying in an
educational setting. See Princeton Univ. Press, 99 F.3d. at 1390-91. See also Loren, supra note 109, at
42 n. 174.
188. Again, while many may find the result that Jason’s use is infringement to be unpalatable, that
conclusion finds support in the case law. See Princeton Univ. Press, 99 F.3d at 1381.
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charge is made to the students for those copies.189
As is evident from the above discussion, a determination of infringement as
an element of criminal copyright infringement may not be an easy one when the
defendant’s use is not motivated by commercial advantage or private financial
gain. Once a defendant raises fair use, and perhaps provides some evidence
concerning the possibility that the use is a fair one, the government should have
the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the use at issue is not
fair.190 This burden should significantly reduce the number of cases in which
non-commercially motivated activity will give rise to criminal liability.191
2. Prosecutorial Discretion
The second factor in determining whether the net of criminal liability has
been cast too wide concerns a reliance on prosecutorial discretion. Even within
the legislative history there is express reliance on this longstanding doctrine of
criminal law to ameliorate the possible over-breadth of the statute.192
Prosecutors should take this express reliance on their discretionary power
seriously and not pursue small scale infringement that is non-commercially
motivated. Copyright law is not solely concerned with protecting the owners of
copyrighted works. The level of protection afforded to copyright owners “must
ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public availability of literature,
music, and the other arts.”193 This ultimate goal of copyright is not simply some
lofty ideal espoused by law professors. Rather, it is embodied in the
constitutional grant of power to Congress enabling the enactment of the
copyright law.194 This fundamental basis for copyright law should be considered
by prosecutors when determining whether to charge an individual with
189. A finding of fair use under these circumstances would be supported by the language of section
107 and by the Supreme Court’s decision in Campbell. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 n. 11 (noting that
“multiple copies for classroom use” is the obvious exception to a bias against nontransformative uses
being fair uses). The decision in Princeton Univ. Press, 99 F3d. 1381, could also be distinguished
because, in that case, the defendant was a for-profit copyshop that charged a per page copying fee for the
classroom copies. Id.
190. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
191. Of course, a copyright owner may be able to prevail on a claim of civil infringement.
192. See 143 CONG. REC. S12,689 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997) (statement in support of passage of the
NET Act by Sen. Hatch) (indicating a reliance on “the good sense of prosecutors and judges”).
193. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (footnotes omitted).
194. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.8.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol77/iss3/3
p835 Loren.doc 02/01/00   5:34 PM
1999] CRIMINAL COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT 871
infringement.
Prosecutors, however, have not always been willing to look away from
small-scale copyright infringement.195 Previously, those small scale
infringements involved commercially motivated transactions. The deliberation
should be affected in the future by the non-commercial nature of the defendant’s
activity. However, prosecutors may interpret the NET Act to constitute a
directive to pursue the small volume copier more aggressively because the NET
Act has lowered the numerical threshold to only one copy.196 R liance on
prosecutorial discretion also increases the possibility that the large content
owning industries, (the motion picture, music, and publishing industries), may
use their influence to promote prosecution of small-scale infringers.197
Even if comfort is found in relying on prosecutorial discretion to curb the
possible over-breadth of the NET Act, the mere threat of criminal prosecution
will deter at least some lawful uses of copyrighted works. Unfortunately some
of these lawful uses are precisely the types of conduct that the policies
underlying copyright law seek to encourage, not discourage.198 While th  NET
Act was passed for the express purpose of deterring the sort of mass-scale
infringement that occurred in the LaMacchia case, it may result in discouraging
other types of lawful activity thereby hampering the ultimate aim of copyright
which is to promote the progress of knowledge and learning.199
Finally, the third factor which must be considered in determining whether the
net of criminal infringement has been cast too wide is the requirement that the
government prove the infringement has been willful.
IV. THE IMPORTANCE OF WILLFULNESS IN CRIMINAL COPYRIGHT
195. See, e.g., United States v. Moran, 757 F. Supp. 1046, 1049 (D. Neb. 1991) (prosecuting the
owner of a “mom-and-pop” movie rental store for making a single unauthorized copy of six movies);
United States v. Wells, 176 F. Supp. 630 (S.D. Tex. 1959) (prosecuting the seller of aerial maps which
were purchased from licensees of copyright owner). Because reported decisions only reflect those cases in
which the defendant has chosen to fight the prosecution rather than accept a plea, they are not indicative of
the true quantity of small-scale infringers pursued.
196. The legislative history indicates that the Justice Department wanted the threshold lowered from
the originally proposed 10 copies and retail value of $5,000 to the adopted level of one copy and retail
value of $1,000 because it anticipated wanting to pursue smaller-scale infringers. H.R. REP. NO. 105-339,
at 7 (1997).
197. See KENNETH C. DAVIS DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (1969); FRANK
W. MILLER, PROSECUTION: THE DECISION TO CHARGE A SUSPECT WITH A CRIME 3 (Frank J. Remington
ed., 1969).
198. See Note, supra note 12, at 1718. See also GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 11.4.1, at 295 n.23
(1989).
199. See Part IV.C.2.(c) infra concerning the importance of not deterring lawful activities in the
realm of copyright law.
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INFRINGEMENT
With the broadened scope of activities that qualify as criminal infringement
and the removal of the profit motive as an element of the offense, the
requirement that the infringing conduct be undertaken willfully clearly takes on
added significance. Even if the requisite numerical thresholds are met, there can
be no criminal liability if the infringement is not willful.
In presenting the NET Act to the Senate, Senator Hatch, the sponsor of the
legislation, lamented that he was “afraid that the language was so broad that the
net could be cast too widely . . . so that minor offenders or persons who honestly
believed that they had a legitimate right to engage in the behavior prohibited by
the bill would be swept in.”200 The example he gave to illustrate his fear was
that of an educator who, not unlike Jason in the hypothetical described above,
believed his use was a fair use. Senator Hatch supported passage of the bill
despite his concern of its over-breadth, largely relying on the requirement that
the infringement be undertaken willfully to limit the reach of the criminal
sanctions.201
What it means to be “willful” in the context of copyright infringement is far
from clear. Under the Copyright Act, willful infringement is used both as an
element of criminal infringement202 and as a standard for increased statutory
damages in a civil infringement suit.203 Yet what it means to be a willful
infringer is not defined in the Copyright Act. Perhaps due to this lack of
definition, willfulness, as interpreted by the courts, seems to mean different
things even within the Copyright Act itself.
The lack of a clear meaing for the term willful in the legislation is not
surprising given that courts also have had great difficulty in defining the term.
200. 143 CONG. REC. S12,689 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997) (statement in support of passage of the
NET Act by Sen. Hatch).
201. See id. In addition to relying on the willfulness requirement to temper the reach of the bill,
Senator Hatch also emphasized his reliance on “the good sense of prosecutors and judges.” Id. For a
discussion of prosecutorial discretion in this area see supra notes 192-99 and accompanying text. See also
4 NIMMER § 15.01[A][2] (noting that the willfulness requirement is “the only bar against an overzealous
prosecutor criminalizing nearly every copyright infringement case”). The legislative history to the most
recent revision of the criminal penalties for copyright infringement prior to the NET Act also made clear
that de minimis copying would not be subject to the new criminal penalties. See H.R. REP. NO. 102-997,
at 6 (1992) (stating that the new felony provisions would not apply to “children making copies for friends
as well as other incidental copying of copyrighted works having a relatively low retail value”).
202. 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) (Supp. III 1997).
203. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2). While not set forth in the section concerning awards of attorney’s fees,
17 U.S.C. § 505, courts also have used willfulness as an element to be considered when determining
whether to award attorney’s fees to a prevailing plaintiff. See, e.g., Canopy Music Inc. v. Harbor Cities
Broad., Inc., 950 F. Supp. 913, 917 (E.D. Wis. 1997).
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As the Supreme Court has recognized, “[t]he word ‘willfully’ is sometimes said
to be ‘a word of many meanings’ whose construction is often dependent on the
context in which it appears.”204 Congressional failure to define willful leaves the
task to the courts.
Most importantly, in defining the contours of what it means to willfully
infringe copyright for purposes of criminal liability, the courts should remember
the ultimate aim of copyright. Copyright is not primarily about providing the
strongest possible protection for copyright owners so that they have the highest
possible incentive to create more works. The control given to copyright owners
is only a means to an end: the promotion of knowledge and learning. Achieving
that underlying goal of copyright law also requires access to copyrighted works
and it requires permitting certain kinds of uses of copyrighted works without the
permission of the copyright owner. While a particular defendant may appear to
be deserving of criminal sanctions, the standard for determining willfulness
should be set with reference to the the larger goals of copyright embodied in the
Constitution and the history of copyright in this country.
Before considering the influence of the fundamental purpose of copyright,
this section first describes the interpretation by various courts of willfulness in
both civil and criminal copyright infringement. Next, this section discusses the
Supreme Court’s approach to interpreting two of the terms used by Congress to
indicate a heightened level of mental awareness: “knowing” and “willful.”
Finally, this section ends with a proposal for the appropriate interpretation of
what it means to be a “willful” infringer for purposes of criminal copyright
infringement. In supporting the standard proposed, this section considers the
constitutional goals of copyright law and the constitutional issues raised by
criminalizing non-commercially motivated infringement.
A. Willfulness Under the Copyright Act
The courts have not provided much detailed consideration to the
interpretation of the willfulness requirement in the context of criminal copyright
infringement. While numerous opinions review the evidence of willfulness in the
civil infringement context, civil penalties are not informed by the same
204. Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 190 (1998) (citing Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492,
497 (1943)). Judge Learned Hand despised the use of the word “willful” in criminal statutes: “It’s an
awful word! It is one of the most troublesome words in a statute that I know. If I were to have the index
purged, “willful” would lead all the rest in spite of its being at the end of the alphabet.” Model Penal Code
and Commentaries, § 2.02, at 249 n.47 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985) (quoting ALI
Proceedings 160 (1955)).
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considerations that inform the interpretation of the mental element requirement
of a criminal offense. Because of the possible confusion between civil
willfulness and criminal willfulness and the lack of specific guidance by
Congress, it is essential that courts apply an appropriate standard when deciding
criminal infringement cases. To fully understand the difficulty in interpreting the
requirement of willfulness in the context of criminal copyright infringement, this
section begins with an exploration of that term in the civil context. It then moves
on to explore the few cases that have interpreted the willfulness requirement in
the criminal context.
1. Civil Willfulness
In a civil suit for infringement, if a plaintiff elects statutory damages205 the
court may award anywhere between $500 and $20,000 for the infringement.206
If the copyright owner proves207 that the civil infringement was committed
willfully, the court has the discretion to increase the civil damages award up to
$100,000.208 The exact nature of the defendant’s mental state required for
enhanced statutory damages is less than clear.209 Sever l courts have stated that
civil willfulness is a question of whether the defendant had “knowledge that its
actions constituted an infringement.”210 These courts hold that such knowledge
may be either actual or constructive.211 Courts have considered many factors in
determining whether the plaintiff has proved constructive knowledge including
205. 17 U.S.C. § 504 (1994 & Supp. III 1997) permits a copyright owner to elect statutory damages
or actual damages. Section 504 requires that the copyright owner comply with certain registration
requirements in order to be eligible to elect statutory damages in lieu of actual damages. Section 412 of
the Copyright Act sets forth the registration requirements that are the prerequisites for statutory damages
and also for an award of attorney’s fees under section 505. 17 U.S.C. § 412 (1994).
206. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (1994). This section provides for such an award for all infringements
involved in the action with respect to any one work. Thus, if more than one work is at issue, separate
statutory damages are available for each work infringed.
207. The copyright owner has the burden of proving willful infringement. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2)
(Supp. III 1997).
208. Id. Proof that a defendant willfully infringed also can support an award of attorney’s fees. See
Canopy Music, 950 F. Supp. at 917; Peer Int’l Corp. v. Luna Records, Inc., 887 F. Supp. 560, 570
(S.D.N.Y. 1995); Chi-Boy Music v. Charles Club, Inc., 930 F.2d 1224, 1230 (7th Cir. 1991);
International Korwin Corp. v. Kowalczyk, 665 F. Supp. 652 (N.D. Ill. 1987).
209. See Ting Ting Wu, The New Criminal Copyright Sanctions: A Toothless Tiger?, 39 IDEA: J.
L. & TECH. 527, 531-538 (1999) (discussing the various cases concerning willfulness in the civil
context).
210. N.A.S. Import Corp. v. Chenson, 968 F.2d 250, 252 (2d Cir. 1992) (quoting Fitzgerald
Publishing Co. v. Baylor Publ’g Co., 807 F.2d 1110, 1115 (2d Cir. 1986)).
211. See, e.g., N.A.S. Import Corp., 968 F.2d at 252.
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whether the defendant consulted an attorney,212 whether the defendant failed to
investigate a possible infringement,213 whether the defendant disregarded
warning letters,214 the size and nature of the defendant,215 the defendant’s past
copyright violations,216 intentional misrepresentations to others concerning the
legality of the infringing conduct,217 and the failure to appear or cooperate in
litigation.218 Often these courts also apply an objective standard of
reasonableness, holding that defendants were willful infringers because they
knew or should have known that their activities constituted copyright
infringement.219 Other courts have stated that the willfulness standard in the civil
context requires either knowledge that the conduct is an infringement of
copyright or a reckless disregard of the copyright owner’s rights.220
Some courts have held that knowledge of potential liability is not equivalent
to willfulness when the infringer possesses a reasonable and good-faith belief
that her actions do not constitute infringement.221 This standard requires proof
of both an objective element, a reasonable belief, and a subjective element, a
good faith belief, in order for the infringement not to be deemed willful. While
this may be a good standard in the civil context, it is not an appropriate standard
for criminal infringement cases, as explained below.
212. See International Korwin Corp. v. Kowalczyk, 855 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1988); RCA/Ariola Int’l,
Inc. v. Thomas & Grayston Co., 845 F.2d 773, 779 (8th Cir. 1988); Rare Blue Music, Inc. v. Guttadauro,
616 F. Supp. 1528 (D. Mass. 1985).
213. See Kowalczyk, 855 F.2d at 375; Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. J.F. Reichert, Inc.,
658 F. Supp. 458 (E.D. Pa. 1987); Worlds of Wonder, Inc. v. Vector Intercontinental, Inc., 1 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1982 (N.D. Ohio 1986).
214. See N.A.S. Import Corp., 968 F.2d 250 (2d Cir. 1992); Fitzgerald Publ’g Co., 807 F.2d at
1115.
215. Fallaci v. New Gazette Literary Corp. 568 F. Supp. 1172 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Worlds of Wonder,
1 U.S.P.Q.2d 1982.
216. See Flyte Tyme Tunes v. Miszkiewicz, 715 F. Supp. 919 (E.D. Wis. 1989); Delman Fabrics,
Inc., v. Holland Fabrics, Inc., 228 U.S.P.Q. 596 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Wow & Flutter Music v. Len’s Tom
Jones Tavern, Inc., 606 F. Supp. 554 (W.D.N.Y. 1985).
217. See Fitzgerald Publ’g, 807 F.2d 1110; Cormack v. Sunshine Food Stores, Inc., 675 F. Supp.
374 (E.D. Mich. 1987); Johnson v. Salomon, 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 801 (D. Minn. 1977).
218. See Fallaci, 568 F. Supp. at 1172.
219. See Fitzgerald Publ’g, 807 F.2d at 1115; Nick-O-Val Music Co. v. P.O.S. Radio, Inc., 656 F.
Supp. 826 (M.D. Fla. 1987); Wow & Flutter Music, 606 F. Supp. 554; Fallaci, 568 F. Supp. 1172.
220. See Video Views, Inc. v. Studio 21, 925 F.2d 1010 (7th Cir. 1991); Kowalczyk, 855 F.2d at
379-82; Lauratex Textile Corp. v. Allton Knitting Mills, 519 F. Supp. 730 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
221. See Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996) (en
banc); Peer International Corp. v. Pausa Records, Inc., 909 F.2d 1332, 1336 (9th Cir. 1990);
Blendingwell Music. Inc. v. Moor-Law, Inc., 612 F. Supp. 474, 486 n.18 (D. Del. 1985). In Peer
International the court held that once the plaintiff had met its burden the defendant could refute the
showing of willful infringement by establishing its good-faith belief in the innocence of its conduct and the
reasonableness of such belief. In that case, the defendant failed to meet that burden. See also 4 NIMMER
§ 14.04[B][3] (1999).
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The level of knowledge required for willful infringement in the civil context
is further confused by examining the three categories of civil infringement
addressed in the statutory damages provision of the Copyright Act: innocent,
ordinary, and willful. Ordinary infringement is the default rule. The burden is on
the defendant to shift the category of infringement from ordinary to innocent,
whereas the burden is on the plaintiff to shift the category of infringement from
ordinary to willful. Some have argued that because an innocent civil infringer is
defined in the statute as one who is “not aware and had no reason to believe that
his or her acts constituted infringement of copyright,”222 then an ordinary
infringer must be one who, at a minimum, is knowing or negligent, and a willful
infringement must, therefore, mean something more than just knowledge.223
However, civil infringement is also a strict liability offense, requiring no
knowledge or intent on the part of a defendant.224 Therefore, requiring
knowledge for willfulness does distinguish an ordinary civil infringer from a
willful civil infringer. Yet if ordinary infringement does not require knowledge
that the acts constitute infringement, how is innocent infringement distinguished
from ordinary infringement?225
The better view is that innocent civil infringement requires not only a
subjective lack of awareness that the acts constitute infringement, but also an
objective element that there was no reason to believe that such acts could
constitute copyright infringement. Put differently, in order to be an innocent
infringer the defendant would need to show both (1) a subjective lack of
knowledge that the conduct constitutes infringement, which would include a
subjective good-faith belief that the activity did not constitute infringement; and
222. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (Supp. III 1997).
223. See Jeffrey M. Thomas, Comment, Willful Copyright Infringement: In Search of a Standard,
65 WASH. L. REV. 903, 912-13 (1990). This Comment proposes the standard for willfulness in the civil
context should require “knowledge of the likelihood of adverse rights of another and . . . an affirmative
duty to investigate and determine in good faith whether the activity will infringe upon those rights.” Id. at
915. This standard draws on a test once used in patent law for determining whether enhanced civil
damages should be awarded. Courts now use a totality of the circumstances test for that determination.
See Timothy N. Trop, The Evolution of the Totality of the Circumstances Test for Willful Infringement,
27 IDEA: J. L. & TECH. 241 (1986). However, under our current copyright law, any work “fixed in a
tangible medium of expression,” 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1994), is likely protected by copyright law unless it is
an extremely old work. No registration is needed, nor is a copyright notice required. Thus, potentially,
everyone always has knowledge of the likelihood of adverse rights of another when they know that they
are copying from another work. The proposed standard then becomes a duty to investigate and determine
in good faith whether the activity infringes.
224. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 198, § 9.4 (1999); Fitzgerald Publ’g. Co., 807 F.2d 1110.
225. 4 NIMMER § 14.04[B][3] (1999) (stating that due to the three types of infringement in section
504, “one who has been notified that his conduct constitutes copyright infringement, but who reasonably
and in good faith believes the contrary, is not ‘willful’”).
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(2) that such subjective state of mind was objectively reasonable. This is
consistent with the language of the statute.226An ordinary infringer is one who
cannot prove both of these elements. With this distinction between an innocent
and an ordinary infringer in place, a willful infringer in the civil context would
be one whom a plaintiff could prove lacks both an objectively reasonable belief
in the lawfulness of the activity and a subjective good faith belief in the
lawfulness of the activity.
While many cases interpret whether a plaintiff has proven willfulness in the
civil context, relatively few cases analyze the willfulness requirement in the
criminal context. The interpretations of what constitutes willful infringement in
cases seeking an enhancement of statutory damages must be viewed cautiously,
if at all, for guidance on the issue of willfulness in the criminal context. The
ramifications of a criminal conviction require that the courts consider more
carefully the element of “willfulness” in the criminal context. Civil damages do
not necessarily require an awareness of wrongdoing. However, the Supreme
Court has indicated that absent clear evidence of congressional intent to the
contrary, felony convictions require some awareness of wrongdoing.227
2. Criminal Willfulness
The mens rea requirement of willfully infringing copyright for criminal
liability has been in the statute from the time criminal sanctions were first added
to copyright law in 1897. When it passed the Copyright Felony Act, Congress
indicated that it intended the courts to continue to define “willful” in the context
of criminal infringement.228 Yet the courts have not had much occasion to
examine the mens rea underpinnings of the willfulness requirement for criminal
copyright infringement.
Several sources, including the legislative history of the NET Act itself, cite a
split in authority concerning the knowledge level required to be a willful
infringer guilty of criminal infringement.229 These sources explain that there is a
minority view that holds that “willful” means only an intent to copy, not an
intent to infringe. The two cases typically cited to support that purported
226. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (Supp. III 1997).
227. See Liparotta v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 425 (1985).
228. See H.R. REP. NO. 102-997, pt. 4-5, at 4 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3569, 3573.
229. See 143 CONG. REC. H9883, H9885 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1997) (statement of Rep. Goodlatte);
Saunders, supra note 38, at 688; Lilli Hsieh et al., Intellectual Property Crimes, AM. CRIM. L. REV. 899,
917 (1998) (describing a majority view and a minority view adopted by the Second and Ninth Circuits); 4
NIMMER § 15.01[A][2] nn.43-44 and accompanying text.
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minority view230 are not nearly as definite as commentators have made them out
to be. Neither of these cases involves any outright statement of the standard and
at least one, and perhaps both, appear to require not just knowledge of the act of
copying but also knowledge that the law forbids such copying.231
What several sources describe as the majority view holds that showing
criminal willfulness requires proof of a “voluntary, intentional violation of a
known legal duty.”232 Yet even with this majority view, the cases discussing
criminal willfulness are less than satisfactory in their analysis. Only one, United
States v. Moran,233 provides any discussion of the possible standards and the
justification for using one standard over another.
In Moran, the defendant, a police officer for over twenty-two years, admitted
to copying copyrighted motion pictures on video cassettes and then renting those
copies to the public through his movie rental business. Mr. Moran testified that
he believed that his actions were legal because he purchased the video cassettes
from which he made the copies, he did not make multiple copies of any one tape
he had purchased, and he did not try to rent both the purchased tape and the
duplicate he made.234 After exploring the interpretation of willfulness in both the
civil and criminal copyright contexts, Magistrate Judge Richard G. Kopf came
to the conclusion that the standard enunciated by the Supreme Court in Cheek v.
United States235 should be applied.236 In Cheek, the Supreme Court held that
230. United States v. Taxe, 380 F. Supp. 1010 (C.D. Ca. 1974), aff’d in part rev’d in part 540 F.2d
961 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1040 (1977); United States v. Backer, 134 F.2d 533, 535 (2d
Cir. 1943). Hsieh, supra note 229, also cites United States v. Hernandez, 952 F.2d 1110 (9th Cir. 1991).
Hernandez, however, does not involve an analysis of willfulness in the context of copyright infringement,
but rather the intent necessary to be convicted of joining a conspiracy to infringe. Id. at 1114.
231. In its discussion of the sufficiency of the evidence of willfulness, the Backer court indicated that
the defendant had issued instructions to copy the works at issue “as closely as they might ‘without
copyright trouble.’” Backer, 134 F.2d at 535. At a minimum, this statement clearly indicated the
defendant’s awareness of the copyright law’s prohibition on copying and its application to his conduct. Id.
In Taxe, the court also indicated that the jury needed to determine whether the defendant was aware of the
law that prohibited his conduct. Taxe, 540 F.2d at 969 (noting that the statements made by counsel for the
copyright owner to the defendant concerning the infringing nature of defendant’s conduct could be used by
the jury to determine whether defendant’s actions were willful).
232. Moran, 757 F. Supp. at 1049; see also United States v. Cross, 816 F.2d 297, 303 (7th Cir.
1987) (requiring proof that defendant engaged in conduct with knowledge that his activity was prohibited
by law); United States v. Heilman, 614 F.2d 1133, 1137-38 (7th Cir. 1980) (citing evidence of
defendant’s knowledge of the illegality of his conduct to support a finding of willfulness), cert. denied,
477 U.S. 922 (1980); United States v. Wise, 550 F.2d at 1194 (9th Cir. 1977) (requiring that the
prosecution prove that the defendant knew the copies he sold had not been first sold by the copyright
owner for purposes of the first sale limitation), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 929 (1977).
233. Moran, 757 F. Supp. 1046.
234. See id. at 1048. Mr. Moran explained that he made these copies to protect against destruction of
the tapes he was renting.
235. 498 U.S. 192 (1991).
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showing willfulness requires proof that the defendant was aware of the duty at
issue and also requires negating a defendant’s claim of either ignorance of the
law or a good-faith belief in the lawfulness of the activity at issue.237 This
negation is part of the government’s burden “because one cannot be aware that
the law imposes a duty upon him and yet . . . believe that the duty does not
exist.”238
The Moran court justified the application of the Cheek standard by
comparing the civil willfulness cases and determining that the criminal standard
of willfulness should be no less stringent. The court went on to clarify that the
defendant’s belief that his conduct is lawful is not to be judged by an objective
standard but rather a subjective, good-faith belief in the lawfulness of the
activity. The court, citing Cheek, noted that the more unreasonable that belief is,
the more difficult it will be for the finder of fact to believe the credibility of an
assertion of a good-faith belief, but that such credibility determination is to be
left to the trier of fact.239
Despite the clear and concise opinion in Moran, courts and commentators
continue to offer different formulations of the proof required to show criminal
willfulness. Professor Paul Goldstein has stated that in order to show criminal
willfulness, the government must “prove that the defendant knew that his acts
constituted copyright infringement or, at least, knew that there was a high
probability that his acts constituted copyright infringement.”240 At least one
court has used this standard as well.241 Knowing that there is a high probability
that certain actions constitute infringement may or may not negate a good-faith
belief that the actions are not infringement, but Professor Goldstein’s proof
standard does appear to be easier for the government to meet than the standard
announced in Cheek. The assessment of whether there is a “high probability”
that an activity constitutes infringement involves an element of objective
reasonableness. It is possible for a defendant to hold a good-faith belief that the
activity is not infringing and yet also be aware that there is a high probability,
although not a certainty, that the activity constitutes infringement. Using the
“high probability” standard imports a level of objectivity, by judging the
236. Moran, 757 F. Supp. at 1050-51.
237. Cheek, 498 U.S. at 202.
238. Id.
239. Moran, 757 F. Supp. at 1051.
240. 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 11.4.1. at 11:51-11:52 (2d ed. Supp. 1999).
241. See Heilman, 614 F.2d at 1138 (holding that willfulness had been proved because the defendant
“chose to persist in conduct which he knew had ‘a high likelihood of being held by a court of competent
jurisdiction to be a violation of a criminal statute’”) (citations omitted).
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defendant’s belief based on the probability of an outcome.
Other commentators have suggested that a reckless disregard for the rights
of copyright owners could be sufficient to show willfulness in a criminal
context.242 When it comes to copyright law, with all of its complications and
gray areas, a reckless disregard for the rights of copyright owners may be
considerably different from a lack of a good-faith belief in the lawfulness of
one’s conduct.
The courts have not given much detailed consideration of the standard of
willfulness required under the criminal provisions of the Copyright Act. The
result is uncertainty in an area already filled with vagueness, gray areas, and
doctrines with no bright line rules. The imposition of criminal sanctions,
however, is a serious matter, and the retention of the willfulness requirement by
Congress is a significant indication of the types of activities meant to give rise to
criminal liability. Therefore, the next section of this article describes the
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the specific intent requirements in federal
statutory criminal law.
242. See 142 CONG. REC. H9883, H9884 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1997) (statement of Rep. Coble).
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B. Willfulness in Criminal Law
Historically, crimes involved a mens rea or “evil-meaning mind.”243 That
evil-meaning mind existed when an individual consciously chose to engage in an
activity that was wrong in the moral sense of the word.244At early common law,
most activities that were morally wrong were not difficult to determine, as the
social convictions of relatively homogeneous societies reflected generally
acknowledged wrongs.245 Thus, those acts that constituted crimes were
generally known among the individuals in society and prosecutors could prove a
defendant’s evil-meaning mind by showing that the defendant had chosen to
engage in one of those acts. As criminal offenses moved from the common law
of generally recognized wrongs to regulatory statutory offenses, acts that were
“crimes” no longer necessarily reflected generally acknowledged wrongs. The
justification for convicting someone of a statutory crime because they had
committed an act with an “evil-meaning mind” became more difficult to find.246
One rationalization for permitting the conviction of a person who had
violated a criminal statutory provision was the now generally accepted maxim
of criminal law that ignorance of the law is no defense.247 If all individuals are
deemed to be aware of the law, then violating that law necessarily means having
an evil-meaning mind. The defendant knows that the act is against the law, yet
violated it anyway and therefore should be punished. While the assumption that
all citizens are deemed to be aware of the law may be justifiable when the laws
reflect a broad moral consensus or make criminal extremely immoral behavior,
justification for criminal liability is illusory when the activity proscribed is less
reprehensible or not as universally condemned.
The normative, or culpability-based aspect of criminal law slipped fully out
of the picture when courts began interpreting many regulatory crimes as strict
243. See JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 70-72 (2d ed. 1960). Historically,
the term “mens rea” reflected normative, or moral, notions. See Susan Mandiberg, The Dilemma of
Mental State in Federal Regulatory Crimes: The Environmental Example, 25 ENVTL. L. 1165, 1177
(1995). While the term has more recently been used in a descriptive way to generally refer to a “mental
state,” id. at 1178, it is used in this article in its normative sense. Id. at 1178.
244. Mandiberg, supra note 243, at 1178.
245. See id.
246. Id. at 1180.
247. See, e.g., Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 193 (1998) (stating that the background
presumption that every citizen knows the law makes it unnecessary to adduce specific evidence to prove
that ‘an evil-meaning mind’ directed the ‘evil-doing hand.’”); Cheek, 498 U.S. at 201. Other justifications
developed included branding all civil wrongs as immoral and declaring that if congress determined an act
should be criminal it was therefore immoral. See Mandiberg, supra note 243, at 1179-81.
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liability offenses, with no requirement of a bad purpose or evil-meaning mind.248
Courts widely recognize, however, that Congress can modify strict liability for
regulatory offenses by specifying a mental element for the offense.249 Often the
words used to indicate such a mental element are that the act be undertaken
“knowingly” or “willfully” or, in some instances, “knowingly and willfully.”250
When used to define the mental state of an offense, knowingly is commonly
understood to require only “proof of knowledge of the facts that constitute the
offense.”251 For example, the knowing violation of an escape statute could be
shown by demonstrating that the “escapee knew his actions would result in his
leaving physical confinement without permission.”252 There are, however,
exceptions to this standard interpretation of the term “knowingly.” For example,
in Liparota v. United States,253 the Supreme Court concluded that “knowingly”
referred to knowledge of the law as well as knowledge of the relevant facts.254
At issue in Liparota was a conviction for the felony offense of knowingly
purchasing food stamps “in any manner not authorized by [the statute] or the
regulations.”255 The government produced evidence that the defendant was
aware of buying the food stamps and of paying less than face value for them.
The Supreme Court reversed the convictions, holding that the government was
also required to show “that the defendant knew his conduct to be unauthorized
by statute or regulation.”256
The two different interpretations of the term knowingly257 c rrespond to the
category in which the offense at issue is classified. If the offense is a “public
248. See Mandiberg, supra note 243, at 1185-86.
249. This “mental element” is different from the concept of mens rea when used in its normative
sense. See supra note 243 and accompanying text. The interaction between traditional mens rea and the
evolving use of specific intent language by Congress is complex. The summary provided here does not
reflect the full subtlety of the issues. For example, strict liability under the common law means there is no
requirement of a bad purpose or evil-meaning mind, a.k.a mens rea, whereas under the Model Penal Code
strict liability means no mental element for the offense. See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.02 & 2.05.
250. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 7203 (1998); 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(4) (1996); Section 15(b)(4)(D), 15
U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(D) (1997), and Section 32(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (1997), of the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934; section 523(A)(1)(C) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 523(A)(1)(C) (1993).
251. Bryan, 524 U.S. at 193.
252. Unites States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 408 (1980).
253. 471 U.S. 419, 425 (1985).
254. Id.
255. Id. at 420 (citing 7 U.S.C. § 2024(b)(1) (1982)).
256. Id. at 425. In Liparota the Supreme Court required the prosecution to prove that the defendant
had knowledge that the activity was in violation of the law, but not necessarily that the defendant knew the
activity was criminal.
257. A court may decide which of these interpretations to employ only if the statute is ambiguous as
to what is meant by the use of the term “knowingly.”
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welfare offense,”258 the term knowingly does not include knowledge of the law
prohibiting the act because such offenses regulate behavior that “a reasonable
person should know is subject to stringent public regulation and may seriously
threaten the community’s health or safety.”259 In o her words, a public welfare
offense is the kind of offense that is generally condemned by society because of
the potential harm involved. For all other regulatory offenses, a knowing
violation of the law also requires proof that the defendant was aware that the
conduct was proscribed by law.260
While the Supreme Court has never addressed whether copyright
infringement is a public welfare offense, copyright infringement is not akin to
the types of offenses the Court has found to be public welfare offenses.
Copyright infringement, while it may significantly threaten a copyright owner’s
wallet, does not seriously threaten a community’s health or safety. Therefore, if
one were to follow the reasoning used for the interpretation of “knowing”
crimes, proof of knowledge of copyright law should be required to obtain a
conviction.
Similar to the term knowingly, the term willfully also maintains a dual
meaning within criminal regulatory statutes. Generally, the Court has held that
to sustain a case of a willful violation of a statute “the Government must prove
that the defendant acted with knowledge that his conduct was unlawful.”261 This
has been described by the Court as requiring the jury to “find that the defendant
acted with an evil-meaning mind . . . .”262 The knowledge of the unlawfulness of
the conduct need not involve a specific awareness of the statutory offense
committed. Rather, a general knowledge that the type of activity involved is
unlawful is all that is required.263
258. Liparota, 471 U.S. at 432. Offenses that the Court has found to fall into this category include
possession of unlawful firearms, see Rogers v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 673, 674-76 (1998), Staples v.
United States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994), United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601 (1971); transporting hazardous
chemicals, see United States v. International Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558 (1971); and prison
escape statutes, see Bailey, 444 U.S. 394.
259. Liparota, 471 U.S. at 433.
260. Id. at 428-30. See also Mandiberg, supra note 243, at 1198-99 (noting that for offenses not
within the “public welfare offenses” category the Court has required “something more” than just
awareness of the activity, which can be met by either proof of awareness of the law prohibiting the activity
or awareness of the probable consequences of the activity).
261. Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 137 (1994).
262. Bryan, 524 U.S. at 193.
263. Id. In Bryan, the Court rejected the defendant’s argument that he could not be convicted of
knowingly violating a statute when he did not have a specific awareness of the statutory section under
which he had been charged, when the evidence supported the conclusion that the defendant knew generally
that the activity in which he was engaging was unlawful.
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However, an existing exception to this general interpretation of the term
willful requires that the government prove that the defendant was aware that his
conduct was generally unlawful. This heightened standard also provides that
ignorance of the provisions of the law or a good-faith belief in the lawfulness of
the activity will negate willfulness.264 To date the Supreme Court has applied
this heightened standard in two contexts: willful violations of currency
transaction structuring laws265 nd willful violations of tax laws.266
In United States v. Ratzlaf267 the Supreme Court held that establishing a
willful violation of the law requires proof “that the defendant acted with
knowledge that his conduct was unlawful.”268 The statute at issue involved the
prohibition of the practice of structuring a transaction with a financial institution
so as to avoid federal reporting requirements.269 Th  trial judge had required
that the prosecution prove only that the defendant knew of the reporting
requirements and that the defendant attempted to evade those requirements. The
trial judge did not require the government to prove that defendant knew that
structuring the transaction so as to avoid the reporting requirements was
unlawful. Finding that not all transaction structuring is done with a bad purpose
and that “currency structuring is not inevitably nefarious,”270 the C rt held that
the willfulness requirement is not satisfied without evidence that the defendant
knew that the structuring of transactions was prohibited by law.
In United States v. Cheek271 the Supreme Court held that in order to prove a
willful violation of the tax laws, the government must prove that the defendant
was aware of the duty at issue. The Court stated that to carry its burden of
proving willfulness the government must negate a defendant’s claim of either
ignorance of the law or that as a result of a misunderstanding of the law the
defendant had a good-faith belief that he was not violating the law.272 The Court
found that this negation is properly part of the government’s burden because one
cannot be aware of a legal duty when the person believes that the duty does not
264. See id. at 1946.
265. Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 138.
266. Cheek, 498 U.S. at 201.
267. Ratzlaf, 498 U.S. 135.
268. Id. at 137.
269. Id. at 136 (citing 31 U.S.C. § 324 (1994)). Structuring a transaction involves breaking up a
single transaction that exceeds the reporting requirement level into two or more separate transactions that
do not exceed that level for the purpose of evading the reporting obligation. 31 U.S.C. § 5324 (1993).
270. Id. at 143-44.
271. Cheek, 498 U.S. at 201.
272. Id. at 202.
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exist.273 Thus, the required awareness cannot exist if the jury credits testimony
showing that the defendant had a good-faith misunderstanding concerning the
duty imposed by law, even if that claimed misunderstanding is otherwise
objectively unreasonable.274 To judge a person’s belief by an objective standard
could remove from the finder of fact consideration of the defendant’s knowledge
and belief by making the inquiry a legal one, not a factual one.275 The Court
believed that to prevent the jury from considering evidence of a good-faith but
unreasonable belief concerning the law could also implicate a defendant’s right
to a jury trial.276
In cases where the Supreme Court has required that the government prove a
subjective awareness of the provision of the statute that the defendant is charged
with violating, the Court has based this requirement on two grounds. First, the
technical and complex nature of the tax laws and the currency laws create “the
danger of ensnaring individuals engaged in apparently innocent conduct.”277
Because of this risk, showing “willfulness” requires proof of knowledge of the
law.278 This interpretation of the willfulness requirement represents an exception
to the traditional rule that ignorance of the law is not a defense justified by the
complexity of the law at issue.279
The second justification provided for requiring proof of a defendant’s
awareness of the law is that the tax code or the currency laws “sometimes
criminalize conduct that would not strike an ordinary citizen as immoral or
likely unlawful.”280 Not requiring proof of knowledge of the law could lead to an
unfair result—criminal prosecutions of “individuals who subjectively and
honestly believe they have not acted criminally.”281 In both of these areas of law,
the Court has interpreted the willfulness requirement to require proof of mens
rea in the normative sense. Showing that the defendant was subjectively aware
of the provisions of the law allegedly violated proves an evil-meaning mind and
justifies criminal liability for what might otherwise be innocent activity.
The distinct interpretations of the requirements for proving “willfulness” in
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 203.
276. Id.
277. Bryan, 524 U.S. at 193-95. See also Cheek, 498 U.S. at 199-200, 205; Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at
149.
278. Bryan, 524 U.S. at 195.
279. Id.
280. Bryan, 524 U.S. at 195 n. 22 (quoting then Chief Judge Breyer concurring in United States v.
Aversa, 984 F.2d 493, 502 (1st Cir. 1993)).
281. Id. at 1947.
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the criminal law have a direct bearing on how courts should interpret what must
be shown to prove that a defendant has engaged in infringement “willfully” for
purpose of the criminal provisions of the Copyright Act.
C. The Appropriate Standard for Determining Willful Infringement Under
the NET Act
The importance of a clear understanding of the contours of the willfulness
standard for determining whether the government has carried its burden of
showing that the infringing conduct was criminal cannot be overstated. In
determining whether a defendant’s activity constitutes infringement, the
Copyright Act is complex.282 Not only is the statute relatively long, but it is
counterintuitive and filled with exceptions.283 Broad rights are granted to
copyright owners, but those rights are expressly subject to rights granted to
users of copyrighted works. The rights of users are set forth in fourteen separate
sections of the Copyright Act.284 Some of these sections are specifically tailored
to certain industries,285 certain practices,286 or certain types of works,287 while
other sections grant rights to users that are very open-ended.288 Additionally,
many have begun referring to the recent changes made to the Copyright Act
pursuant to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act289 as the “tax-codification” of
the copyright law.290
For the lay person, knowing whether a particular use constitutes
282. See Mark Lemely, Dealing with Overlapping Copyrights on the Internet, 22 UNIV. DAYTON
L. REV. 548, 577 (1997).
283. Justice Story believed intellectual property was one of the most difficult areas of the law:
“Patents and copyrights approach nearer than any other class of cases belonging to forensic discussions, to
what may be called the metaphysics of the law, where the distinctions are, or at least may be very subtle
and refined, and sometimes, almost evanescent.” Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F.Cas. 342, 344 (C.C.D. Mass.
1841) (No. 4901).
284. 17 U.S.C. § 106 states that the rights granted to copyright owners are “[s]ubject to sections 107
through 120.” Sections 107 through 120 provide various limitations on the rights granted to copyright
owners. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-120 (1994).
285. See 17 U.S.C. § 108 (1994) (providing for reproduction rights for libraries and archives); 17
U.S.C. § 111 (1994) (providing for secondary transmissions of primary transmissions by cable operators).
286. See 17 U.S.C. § 115 (1994) (providing for a scheme of compulsory licensing for the recording
and distribution of nondramatic musical works).
287. See 17 U.S.C. § 113 (1994) (limiting the rights of copyright owners of pictorial, graphic, and
sculptural works), 17 U.S.C. § 114 (limiting the rights of copyright owners of sound recordings).
288. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
289. Pub. Law No. 105-304 (1998).
290. This phrase was used repeatedly by many law professors present at the American Association of
Law Professors Workshop on Intellectual Property, held March 11-13, 1999 in San Francisco, California.
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infringement can be extremely difficult.291 This is especially true when the use
does not involve any kind of profit motive because, under the fair use provisions
of the Copyright Act,292 a non-commercial use is presumptively a fair use,293
and a fair use “is not an infringement of copyright.”294 Fair use remains one of
the most troublesome and unsettled areas of the law.295 The doctrine has been
said to be “so flexible as virtually to defy definition.”296 Described by one
scholar as an “elusive legal doctrine,”297 fair use can involve the straight
reproduction of an entire copyrighted work.298 A fair use can also involve the
reproduction and public distribution of an entire work.299 Y t the statute defines
non-commercial criminal infringement as the “reproduction or distribution” of
more than the threshold value of copyrighted work,300 and the activities that
constitute criminal infringement are defined with reference to civil
infringement.301
After the passage of the NET Act, for someone accused of non-commercial
criminal infringement, the willfulness requirement is the only vehicle by which a
court can consider the defendant’s belief that the activity did not constitute
infringement because it was, for example, a fair use. If the activity is, in fact,
ruled to be a fair use, obviously there can be no conviction. A fair use is, by
definition, not an infringement of copyright.302 But, if the court rejects an
argument that the use is fair, yet defendant had nonetheless believed the use to
be fair, would he still be a criminal? Must his belief be objectively reasonable to
avoid criminal liability? What if his belief could be described as in reckless
disregard of the copyright owners’ rights?
An individual could easily make a mistake concerning whether a certain
291. See Lemley, supra note 282, at 577. There is a noticeable gap between what many people think
the law is and what, in fact, is the law. See Jessica Litman, Copyright Noncompliance, 29 N.Y.U. J.
INT’L. L. & POL. 237 (1997).
292. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
293. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985); Sony Corp. of Am.
v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
294. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
295. See Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996) (en
banc).
296. Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assoc., 293 F. Supp. 130, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
297. MARSHALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 319 (1995).
298. See, e.g., Sony, 464 U.S. 417.
299. See Belmore v. City Pages, 880 F. Supp. 673 (D. Minn. 1995). But see Religious Tech. Ctr. v.
Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1231 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
300. 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)(2) (1994).
301. See Cross, 816 F.2d at 303 (holding that the use of civil definitions of infringement in jury
instructions was appropriate).
302. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
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activity constitutes infringement. That mistake also could appear unreasonable
or in reckless disregard of the rights of copyright owners, to those trained in
copyright law. Because the policy underlying copyright is the promotion of
knowledge and learning, reliance on the various rights granted to users of
copyrighted works, including the fair use rights, should be encouraged.303
Making an error in that reliance already carries with it with the sanctions of civil
infringement actions; it should not turn an individual into a criminal. One way to
assure that the criminal provisions are not overly broad is to employ the
heightened standard of willfulness used by the Supreme Court in other complex
and sometimes counter-intuitive areas of law that apply broadly to members of
the general public.304
Similarly, because a doctrine as elusive as fair use will play a vital role in
many non-commercially motivated infringements, the appropriate standard for
determining willfulness should be set at a heightened level.
1. The Proposed Standard for Willfulness
A defendant should be guilty of willfully infringing copyright only if the
government can prove an intentional violation of a known legal duty. To carry
this burden, the government should be required to negate a defendant’s claim of
ignorance of the law or a claim that because of a misunderstanding of the law
the defendant had a good-faith belief that he was not violating any provisions of
the Copyright Act. This good-faith belief must only be judged subjectively, with
no requirement that the belief be objectively reasonable.305
2. Supporting Authority for the Standard
The application of this standard is supported by the statutory language of the
Copyright Act, the legislative history of the NET Act, and case law interpreting
criminal copyright infringement prior to the passage of the NET Act. Finally,
Supreme Court precedent concerning the interpretation of willfulness, together
with the policy behind the Copyright Act provide perhaps the most persuasive
303. Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 527 (1994).
304. Environmental protection statutes are also complex yet do not inspire the same concern in the
Court. This may be attributed to the fact that environmental statutes apply only to specific industries and
thus those within the industry regulated can be expected to know the laws governing them. Copyright law,
on the other hand, like tax and currency structuring laws, applies to the public at large.
305. The articulation of the this standard parallels that set out by the Supreme Court in Cheek v.
United States, 498 U.S. 192, 202 (1998).
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support for this standard.
Before discussing the supporting authority for the proposed standard, it is
important to clarify that the proposed standard does not create a mistake of law
defense. First, the definition of the offense contains a legal element: willfully
infringing copyright is required. Lack of proof that the defendant was aware that
her actions violated a legal duty, namely that her actions constituted
infringement, translates into a failure to prove an element of the offense: willful
infringement.306
a. Statutory Language
When seeking to determine the appropriate standard to apply, the statutory
language must first be consulted. The NET Act does provide one piece of
guidance on how to determine if an infringement is willful. The Act specifies
that for criminal infringement actions, “evidence of reproduction or distribution
of a copyrighted work, by itself, shall not be sufficient to establish willful
infringement.”307 Thus, the NET Act requires more than general intent and
clearly rejects any application of the purported minority view of what
constitutes willfulness.308 This statutory language indicates that to prove a
defendant has willfully infringed, the government must show more than merely
an intentional act of copying or distribution. However, what additional proof is
needed is not specified in the Act.
The additional proof that should be required is a showing that the defendant
knew her activities were in violation of a legal duty under the Copyright Act. In
other words, the government should be required to prove that the defendant
knew her actions constituted copyright infringement.309
306. See Liparota, 471 U.S. at 425 n.9. In Liparota, the Court explained that in the case of a receipt-
of-stolen-goods statute there is the legal element that the goods were stolen. It is not a defense to such a
statute that the defendant did not know that such receipt was illegal, but it is a defense that the defendant
did not know that the goods were stolen. Id. Thus, in the Copyright context it would not be a defense to
argue that the defendant did not know that willfully infringing copyright was illegal, but it would be a
defense to argue that the defendant did not believe his activity to be infringing.
307. NET Act § 2(b), 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)(2) (Supp. III 1997). This provision was added in response
to the concerns of libraries and Internet access providers that “willfulness” might be broadly interpreted by
the courts and possibly reach to those providing the equipment that makes the reproduction or distribution
of unauthorized copies possible. See 143 CONG. REC. S12,689 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997) (statement in
support of passage of the NET Act by Sen. Leahy). As written, this addition also should provide some safe
harbor for an individual who makes copies for friends and is unaware of the restrictions imposed on that
activity by the Copyright Act.
308. See supra notes 230-42 and accompanying text (describing the “minority view” as holding that
willful means only an intent to copy, not an intent to infringe).
309. The government should be required to show the defendant knew her actions were in violation of
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b. Legislative History
In urging passage of the NET Act, Senator Hatch, the bill’s sponsor, stated
that he “placed great store by the ‘willfulness’ requirement.”310 He then
described his understanding of the meaning of the word as “the intent to violate
a known legal duty.”311 In support of this standard, Senator Hatch cited United
States v. Cheek, among other Supreme Court precedent.312 Senator Hatch also
stated that an educator who believed in good faith that her use was fair use
would not be a criminal infringer,313 indicating an intent to permit a good-faith
belief in the lawfulness of the activity to negate willfulness. The Register of
Copyrights also urged that under the language of the NET Act, a good-faith
belief in the lawfulness of one’s conduct should insulate an individual from
criminal liability.314
Although the legislative history does contain support for the proposed
standard, statements by others indicate an understanding that a more relaxed
standard of willfulness was intended. For example, Representative Goodlatte
asserted that the government does not need to prove “the defendant’s state of
mind” or “that the defendant was familiar with the criminal copyright statute or
violated it intentionally.”315 Representative Goodlatte went on to state that
“[p]articularly in cases of clear infringement, the willfulness standard should be
satisfied if there is adequate proof that the defendant acted with reckless
disregard of the rights of the copyright holder.”316 In those circumstances, he
asserted, “a proclaimed ignorance of the law should not allow the infringer to
the Copyright Act, not necessarily that the defendant knew her action constituted criminal violations.
310. 143 CONG. REC. S12,689 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997) (statement in support of passage of the
NET Act by Sen. Hatch).
311. Id. Senator Hatch also expressly recognized that he was relying on the “good sense of
prosecutors and judges” in curbing the reach of the NET Act, giving the example of treating a “college
prankster” leniently under the Sentencing Guidelines. See id. See also supra Part III.B.2 (discussing the
dangers of relying on prosecutorial discretion to curb the reach of an otherwise overly-broad criminal law).
Senator Hatch also fully acknowledged the potential that the bill might turn out to be draconian, in which
case the issue of criminal copyright infringement would need to be revisited by Congress. See 143 CONG.
REC. S12,689 (statement in support of passage of the NET Act by Sen. Hatch).
312. See id.
313. Id.
314. The No Electronic Theft Act, 1997: Hearing on H.R. 2265 Before the Subcomm. on Courts
and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1997) (statement of
MaryBeth Peters, Register of Copyrights) (suggesting the legislative history specifically refer to United
States v. Cross, 816 F.2d 297, 300 (7th Cir. 1987) and United States v. Moran, 757 F. Supp. 1046 (D.
Neb. 1991)).
315. 143 CONG. REC. H9886 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1997) (statement of Rep. Goodlatte); see also CONG.
REC. H9884 (daily ed. Nov. 11, 1997) (statement of Rep. Coble).
316. 143 CONG. REC. H9883, H9886 (statement of Rep. Goodlatte).
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escape conviction.”317
However, as discussed above, the requirement that a criminal defendant
willfully infringe copyright should be read as a clear indication from Congress
that a heightened mental awareness of the legality of one’s action is an element
of the offense. Representative Goodlatte may have been more concerned with
the problems of proof associated with any specific intent crime, as indicated by
his statement that “[w]illfulness is often established by circumstantial evidence
and may be inferred from the facts and circumstances of each case.”318
However, this does not mean that proof of a defendant’s awareness of the
relevant legal duties is not required.
c. Prior Case Law Under the Copyright Act
As discussed above, several cases interpreting the willfulness requirement
for criminal copyright infringement319 under the prior law held that proving
willfulness required showing an intentional violation of a known legal duty. This
case law also supports permitting a good-faith belief in the lawfulness of the
conduct to negate willfulness, even if that belief is unreasonable. In Moran, the
court clearly held that a good-faith belief, even if unreasonable, does not amount
to willful infringement. The court observed that the more unreasonable the
defendant’s alleged good-faith belief, the more likely it is that the finder of fact
will not find the proof of such belief to be credible.320 But there is no
requirement that the defendant’s belief must be objectively reasonable.321
In addition to Moran, one other criminal copyright infringement case also
seemed to assume that a good-faith belief in the lawfulness of the conduct would
establish a lack of willfulness. In United States v. Sherman,322 t  defendants
were convicted of reproducing and distributing copyrighted sound recordings.323
Defendants asserted that they believed the sound recordings were merely “sound
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. As discussed above, lawyers, judges, and individuals must take care to only consult cases
determining willfulness under the criminal provisions of the Copyright Act, not the cases deciding the
standard to be applied in civil infringement cases. See supra notes 205-28 and accompanying text.
320. Moran, 757 F. Supp. 1046, 1051 (D. Neb. 1991). See also Liparota, 471 U.S. at 434 n.17
(noting the fact that the transaction took place in a “back-room” as circumstantial evidence that the
defendant was aware of the unlawful nature of his activities).
321. A defendant’s disagreement with a known legal duty does not amount to a good-faith belief that
the legal duty does not exist. See Cheek, 498 U.S. at 202-03 and n. 8.
322. United States v. Sherman, 576 F.2d 292 (10th Cir. 1978).
323. Id. at 297.
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alikes” of popular performers and therefore, because they were not reproducing
the actual copyrighted sound recordings, they were not infringing on those
copyrights.324 The court concluded, however, that the evidence of this alleged
good-faith belief was not credible. In its opinion, the court indicated that if the
evidence of defendant’s belief had been credible, the requisite willfulness would
have been lacking.
Both of these cases indicate that a defendant’s credible good-faith belief in
the lawfulness of his conduct negates the required element of willfulness, even if
that belief is unreasonable.
d. Supreme Court Precedent
The justifications for a heightened standard of willfulness articulated by the
Supreme Court under certain statutes persuasively support the application of the
standard proposed above. The Supreme Court has required a more demanding
approach to interpreting the mental state requirement in highly technical statutes
that apply to a broad range of individuals, for example federal tax law and
currency structuring, so long as the statute is not criminalizing conduct that is
inherently dangerous to public health and safety.325 The Supreme Court has held
that this heightened mental state standard is appropriate in cases involving
highly technical statutes because they present the danger of ensnaring average
individuals engaged in apparently innocent conduct.326 The Copyright Act fits
into this category of statute.
The Copyright Act is a highly technical statute327 req iring a mastery of
324. Under the Copyright Act, while copyright owners of sound recordings are given the right of
reproduction under section 106, that right is limited by section 114: “The exclusive rights of the owner of
copyright in a sound recording . . . do not extend to the making or duplication of another sound recording
that consists entirely of an independent fixation of other sounds, even though such sounds imitate or
simulate those in the copyrighted sound recording.” 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) (1994).
325. Even in highly technical statutes, the Supreme Court has been unwilling to apply a heightened
mental state standard if the statute criminalizes conduct that is inherently dangerous to public health and
safety. The Supreme Court has referred to this category of criminal offenses as “public welfare offenses.”
See supra notes 254-60 and accompanying text. A violation of the Copyright Act does not pose an
inherent danger to public health and safety. Therefore, there is no bar to applying the heightened standard
for the willfulness requirement.
326. See Bryan, 524 U.S. at 193-194.
327. See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing difficulties interpreting the Copyright Act). A colleague of
mine who teaches exclusively in the tax area brags that his code is the only code that can stop a bullet (this
is done while holding the two volume set of the current tax code in front of his heart). While the Copyright
Act may not be as verbose and technically detailed as the Internal Revenue Code, it is, nonetheless, as
complex and difficult to understand, perhaps due to its lack of specificity.
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subtleties unique to a law concerning rights in intangibles,328 yet it applies to all
individuals in society.329 In the case of non-commercial infringers, which have
now been brought within the “net” of criminal infringement, there exists a clear
danger of ensnaring people engaged in apparently innocent conduct. Many
people believe that if one does not make money from the reproduction or
distribution of a copyrighted work, it constitutes a fair use and is not
infringement.330 While this certainly holds true in some litigated cases,331 it is
not always true.332 Yet, to criminally penalize someone who has made an
incorrect assumption or misunderstands the law is inappropriate. Such an
incorrect assumption or mistake in the context of copyright law does not reflect
a mens rea or evil-meaning mind. In fact, many unauthorized copies of works
are transmitted electronically or otherwise in order to comment on the work or
spread knowledge about a subject. While a court may determine that such
activity is, in fact, infringing, it should not be criminal.
The highly technical nature of the Copyright Act coupled with the subtle
nature of this evanescent law of intangibles borders on not giving adequate
notice to individuals of the conduct proscribed. In our society, in order to permit
an individual to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws
give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity know what
conduct is prohibited. This is particularly important when the statute imposes
criminal sanctions. The Supreme Court has indicated that a heightened standard
for the mental element of a statutory crime may mitigate a vagueness problem
that a criminal statute might otherwise contain, particularly with respect to the
328. As Justice Story described over 150 years ago, “[p]atents and copyrights approach nearer than
any other class of cases belonging to forensic discussions, to what may be called the metaphysics of the
law, where the distinctions are, or at least may, be very subtle and refined, and sometimes, almost
evanescent.” Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F.Cas. 342, 344 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).
329. Because it applies to all individuals, the Copyright Act is not similar to various environmental
statutes that are highly technical as well. In these environmental statutes, the courts have been unwilling to
apply a heightened standard of the mental element in part because the offenses defined may be seen as
“public welfare offenses,” and also because those statutes only apply to industry participants. Compare
United States v. Int’l Minerals & Chemical Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 569 (1971) (noting that industry
participants should know the law that applies to their business) with Cheek, 498 U.S. at 199-200 (noting
that the “average citizen” has difficulty keeping up with their duties and obligations under the tax laws).
With the removal of the requirement that the infringement be for profit, the criminal provisions of the
Copyright Act now apply to “average citizens.”
330. Most individuals, unless trained in copyright law, do not identify such use as a fair use, using the
term of art under the copyright law, but they will state that there is nothing wrong with their activity, or
that their activity is not illegal. See Litman, supra note 107, at 27-29 & n. 3.
331. See, e.g., Sony, 464 U.S. 417.
332. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1231
(N.D. Ca 1995).
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adequacy of notice as to what activities are prohibited.333
The risk of catching innocent, albeit misguided, individuals within the scope
of a criminal provision of a highly technical and vague law has led the Supreme
Court in other contexts to require proof of knowledge of the legal duties
imposed by that law. This risk has also led the Court to hold that a good-faith
belief, even if objectively unreasonable, negates the “willfulness” required in
these contexts. These same standards should be applied in the context of the
Copyright Act.
Supreme Court precedent also supports judging the defendant’s knowledge
of the legal duties imposed subjectively only. First, even if a good-faith belief is
objectively unreasonable, a defendant still cannot be said to have known of the
duty the law imposes.334 Second, if a defendant’s belief must be an objectively
reasonable one, that requirement “transforms the inquiry into a legal one and
would prevent the jury from considering [the defendant’s belief].”335 Removing
this evidence from the jury’s consideration would create a serious problem
under the Sixth Amendment’s jury trial provision.336
e. The Policy of the Copyright Act
In addition to Supreme Court precedent concerning the importance of
heightened standards of willfulness in certain statutory crimes, the policy goals
of the Copyright Act provide even greater support for the application of a
heightened standard. The fundamental purpose of copyright law is to encourage
the promotion of the progress of knowledge and learning.337 This purpose is
imbedded in the Constitutional grant of power to Congress to enact the
Copyright Act and informs the interpretation of the law.338
Competing social policies underlie the scheme of copyright. One policy
favors wide dissemination of new ideas and new forms of expression while the
other policy encourages the production of new works by providing the economic
incentive of a monopoly to ensure that creators are rewarded for their
333. See, e.g., Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estate, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 499
(1982) (citing cases).
334. See Cheek, 498 U.S. at 203.
335. Id.
336. Id. (citing Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (1985); Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510
(1979); Morisette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952)).
337. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 cl.8. While the Constitution provides that the monopoly of the copyright
is to be granted in order to promote “science,” at the time of its drafting “science” denoted broadly
knowledge and learning. See Seidel, supra note 2.
338. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (1994); Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 527 (1994).
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endeavors. The public benefit predominates,339 how ver, with the remuneration
of authors being a means to achieve that public benefit.340 Therefore, courts
must “be careful not to chill dealing in creative works, when . . . conduct
approaches, but does not cross, the borderline of infringement.”341 The current
copyright law enacted by Congress reflects this underlying policy by
encouraging certain uses of copyrighted works without the permission of the
copyright owner.342 An interpretation of the willfulness requirement of criminal
infringement that does not require proof of knowledge of the legal duties in the
Copyright Act will thwart the underlying, constitutionally mandated goal of
copyright law by making individuals more reluctant to engage in activities that
may, in fact, be permitted by the copyright law.
Criminal sanctions and the threat of criminal sanctions are extremely
chilling, even to activity that does not cross the line into criminal activity, but
only comes near it.343 This chilling effect creates a dilemma in the context of the
Copyright Act, which seeks to encourage use of copyrighted works while
simultaneously providing protection for copyright owners that results in the
incentive to create these works. One way to assure that the activities which are
close to the borderline of infringement are not chilled is to require proof of an
intentional violation of a known legal duty for a criminal conviction, with a
good-faith belief in the lawfulness of the activity negating willfulness.
Importantly, copyright doctrine is also affected by First Amendment
concerns. Our founding fathers believed that the copyright monopoly would be
the “engine of free expression”344 and would, in fact, be a tool of democracy.345
The threat of criminal sanctions acts as a significant deterrent for questionable
activity. In order to facilitate copyright law as an engine of free expression, an
individual who is ignorant of the law or who possesses a good-faith, albeit
339. United States v. Bily, 406 F. Supp. 726, 731 (E.D. Penn. 1975).
340. See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (“[P]rivate motivation
must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public availability of literature, music and the other
arts.”).
341. Bily, 406 F. Supp. at 730.
342. Fair use is a clear example of the type of use authorized by the Copyright Act. Many other
specific uses abound, e.g. public performance or display of copyrighted works in the course of face-to-face
learning activities, 17 U.S.C. § 110(1) (1994); certain photocopying activities by libraries and archives,
17 U.S.C. § 108 (1994); and making and distributing phonorecords of nondramatic musical works, 17
U.S.C. § 115 (1994) (compulsory license provisions).
343. After the passage of the NET Act, many noted its significant chilling effect. See, e.g., Grossman,
supra note 157.
344. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985).
345. Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 288-
89 (1996).
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erroneous, belief that the conduct at issue is lawful, should not be at risk of
being convicted of a felony.
Some may argue that an individual who crosses the line into infringement,
even under a good-faith belief in the lawfulness of their activity, should
nonetheless be held criminally accountable under the NET Act. Under this line
of reasoning, engaging in conduct that is near the line separating non-infringing
from infringing behavior should be discouraged. But it is important to remember
that those who cross the line because of ignorance of the law or a good-faith
belief in the lawfulness of their conduct will still be civilly liable for their
infringement. Civil liability is a strict liability offense.346 A good-faith belief,
even one that is objectively reasonable, is not a defense to civil infringement.
Imposing criminal sanctions on those who cross the line, without requiring proof
of a heightened mens rea, may result in an over-deterrence of the types of legal
activities that approach the border between infringement and non-infringement.
Yet, in many cases, it is those types of activity that copyright law is designed to
encourage.347
3. Proving Defendant Willfully Infringed
Unless the defendant chooses to testify, the government must establish
willfulness by circumstantial evidence.348 The type of evidence that may be used
to show the required mens rea in a criminal copyright infringement action can
vary. The Attorney’s Manual for the Department of Justice encourages
prosecutors to consider the evidence of criminal intent carefully, noting that “the
possession and use of elaborate duplicating equipment and accessories will
normally supply effective evidence of criminal intent.”349 While such equipment
346. See Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H. L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 308 (2d Cir. 1963). See also
H.R. REP. NO. 102-997 (1992).
347. In the context of antitrust violations, the Supreme Court recognized the importance of requiring
the government to prove a mens rea element because without it “overdeterrences would occur when
business people refrained from engaging in the “gray zone of socially acceptable and economically
justifiable business conduct.” United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 441 (1978). In
determining that attorney’s fees should be awarded to prevailing copyright defendants under the same
standards as fees are awarded to prevailing copyright plaintiffs, the Supreme Court stated: “Because
copyright law ultimately serves the purpose of enriching the general public through access to creative
works, it is peculiarly important that the boundaries of copyright law be demarcated as clearly as
possible.” Fogerty, 510 U.S. at 527 (1994).
348. See United States v. Sherman, 576 F.2d 292 (10th Cir. 1978) (noting willfulness is often proved
by circumstantial evidence); United States v. Rose, 149 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 820, 825 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)
(same).
349. UNITED STATES DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, § 9-71.010 (Oct.,
1997).
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would be necessary for certain kinds of criminal infringement, and often is
necessary for infringement engaged in for profit, elaborate duplicating
equipment is not required in a digital environment, nor is it needed to reach the
minimal $1,000 threshold for non-commercially motivated infringement. Other
types of evidence will be necessary to prove the defendant was aware of the
illegality of his actions.
Often, statements that the defendant made to others concerning the legality
or questionable nature of the activity can be used to show that the defendant was
aware of the law prohibiting the conduct.350 While advice of counsel can assist a
defendant in showing a subjective, good-faith belief in the lawfulness of her
actions,351 advice of counsel may also show that the defendant was aware of the
legal obligations imposed upon her.352 Cou ts should be careful, however, when
permitting testimony concerning statements made to the defendant by counsel
for the copyright owner. These statements can be self-serving and overreaching.
Such statements, even by counsel for the copyright owners, may be used to
negate a claim of ignorance of the law, but it is critical that statements by the
copyright owners and their counsels not be weighed too heavily in determining
the defendant’s good-faith belief.
Still another factor that may assist in proving the willfulness of a defendant’s
infringement is the existence of prior civil judgments against the defendant for
similar acts of copyright infringement. These judgments indicate an awareness
that courts interpret the statute as prohibiting the conduct at issue. After such a
judgment, while the defendant may disagree with the court’s interpretation, a
good-faith belief that the conduct is lawful would be difficult to maintain.353
While prior civil judgments against a defendant can provide circumstantial
proof of the defendant’s knowledge of the lawlessness of her conduct, rulings in
other civil cases should not be used as circumstantial evidence of the willfulness
of defendant’s conduct without proof that the defendant was aware of those
rulings. Even an awareness of those rulings, however, may not conclusively
350. See United States v. Backer, 134 F.2d 533, 535 (2d Cir. 1943) (noting evidence on willfulness
included testimony that defendant had instructed others to copy the works at issue “as closely as they
might without ‘copyright trouble’”). See also United States v. Drebin, 557 F.2d 1316, 1324 (9th Cir.
1977) (describing letters sent to customers warning them that the FBI was asking questions and the
customers needed to “be careful about it” and should probably store the copies in a safe place).
351. See Cheek, 498 U.S. at 196 (noting defendant’s evidence included a letter from an attorney
providing legal support for the belief that the defendant’s conduct was lawful).
352. See United States v. Taxe, 540 F.2d 961, 969 (9th Cir. 1976) (noting that advice from counsel
should be considered only in determining whether defendant’s actions were willful).
353. See Cheek, 498 U.S. at 202 (noting that if the defendant knows what the law is but believes it
should be otherwise, knowledge of the legal duty has nonetheless been shown).
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prove the lack of a good-faith belief in the lawfulness of the conduct. Circuit
splits in copyright law are common354 and the Supreme Court often reverses
lower courts on whether certain actions constitute infringement or involve
copyrightable material.355 Additionally, the difference in merely a single,
seemingly insignificant fact can change the infringement analysis, especially in
the context of fair use.356
Evidence of rulings in other cases can, of course, help to show the
reasonableness of the defendant’s belief. However, even if these decisions show
the defendant’s belief to be unreasonable, the court may not remove the decision
on willfulness from the jury. Rather the court should instruct the jury that in
deciding whether to credit the defendant’s claim of a good-faith belief, the jury is
free to consider her awareness of prior court decisions rejecting her
interpretation of the law.357
Turning to the hypotheticals posed earlier,358non  of the individuals making
the copies or distributing the copyrighted works engaged in the conduct for
commercial advantage or private financial gain.359 Each could quite legitimately
claim they believed their copying did not constitute infringement. Despite
authority to support their claims,360 it i  also possible that a court might find
354. Current examples of circuit splits include the interaction between the first sale doctrine and the
creation of derivative works; compare Mirage Editions v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., 856 F.2d 1341 (9th
Cir. 1988) (holding greeting card mounted on tile constitutes a derivative work and thus not protected by
the first sale doctrine) with Lee v. A.R.T. Co., 125 F.3d 580 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding greeting card
mounted on tile does not constitute a derivative work and therefore is protected by the first sale doctrine).
While not a circuit split, the recent ruling concerning the public domain nature of Dr. Martin Luther King
Jr.’s “I Have a Dream” Speech, Estate of MLK, Jr., Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 13 F. Supp.2d 1347 (N.D. Ga
1998), which resulted in an opposite ruling, based on nearly identical facts, from a case decided more than
thirty years prior, King v. Mister Maestro, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 101 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), also shows the
volatile and sometimes unpredictable nature of copyright rulings in this country.
355. See supra note 170 (discussing the Supreme Court’s reversal of the lower court decisions in
each of the major fair use cases it has decided in the last two decades). See also Quality King Distrib., Inc.
v. L’anza Research Int’l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135 (1998) (reversing the court of appeal’s decision that the first
sale doctrine did not apply to imported copies).
356. For example, in the context of a public performance right, a hotel may provide VCRs and
televisions in the room while renting movies from the front desk without infringing. See Columbia
Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc., 866 F.2d 278 (9th Cir. 1989). If, however,
the VCRs are kept at the desk but connected to the televisions in the rooms, the rental of the movies will
constitute an infringement. See On Command Video Corp. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 777 F. Supp. 787
(N.D. Cal. 1991).
357. See Cheek, 498 U.S. at 202 (applying this standard in the context of the tax code).
358. See supra notes 150-70 and accompanying text.
359. Some might argue that Janet’s copying was, in fact, done for private financial gain. Certainly
Janet was not selling the copies of the articles that she provided, but she most likely hoped that her
thoughtfulness in sending the articles would be rewarded with increased sales of her products.
360. See supra notes 171-87 and accompanying text.
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their activities to be infringement. Given the nature of their conduct, however,
the government would bear a heavy burden to negate their claims of a good-
faith belief that they were not violating the law.
CONCLUSION
The continuing expansion of the copyright monopoly threatens to cause
significant harm to the underlying purpose of copyright in the United States.
The NET Act has the potential to exacerbate this damage. Even if properly
interpreted by the courts, the vague nature of the “willfulness” requirement as
seen through the eyes of the public unfortunately will deter many activities that
should, instead, be encouraged in order to promote the ultimate goal of
copyright in this country, the promotion of knowledge and learning.
The adoption of the NET Act in 1997 marked a significant turning point in
the law of criminal copyright infringement by eliminating proof of a profit
motive as a requirement for conviction. The promise of the digital age brings
with it a very real threat of unlimited and unauthorized copying of copyrighted
works. In addition to the challenge presented by the digitization of society,
copyrighted works have increasingly been viewed as “just like” any other
property and thus deserving of protection against theft, regardless of the
motivation for that theft.
Both civil and criminal law seek to shape the behavior of individuals in ways
that are beneficial to society by deterring actions that are determined to be
harmful to society as a matter of public policy. It has been argued that the only
real basis for distinction between crimes and civil wrongs rests in the moral
condemnation which society places on the criminal.361 A civil wrongdoer does
not suffer the same condemnation, at least not to the same degree, as one who is
found guilty of a crime. Therefore, society should not designate as criminal
those acts which lack the blameworthiness deserving of such moral
condemnation.362 Civil infringement provides a legal cause of action against
infringers without regard to knowledge or profit motive.363
Unlike the approach adopted by the NET Act, criminal infringement
361. See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401,
404-406 (1958).
362. See id.
363. While infringement is not affected by the fact that a defendant engaged in the conduct for non-
commercial reasons, the determination of whether the conduct is infringement in the first place can be
influenced by the nonprofit character of the use. This is particulary true in the fair use area. 17 U.S.C. §
107 (1994). See supra notes 159-65 and accompanying text.
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previously required not only proof of willfulness, but proof that the defendant
was engaging in the infringing conduct for commercial advantage or private
financial gain. With the adoption of the NET Act, the only element of the
offense of criminal copyright infringement that stands between legitimate
protection for copyright owners and illegitimate criminalization of widespread
practices of individuals is the requirement that the infringement be willful. The
willfulness requirement in criminal law generally is subject to varying
interpretations depending on the context of its use. For copyright to continue to
be an engine of free expression and a vehicle for promoting the progress of
knowledge and learning, the appropriate interpretation of willfulness in the
criminal infringement context is critical. Proving willfulness in the context of
criminal copyright infringement while maintaining the constitutional aim of the
copyright act requires proof of a violation of a known legal duty. Credible
claims of ignorance of the law or a good-faith belief in the lawfulness of the
activity should negate willfulness.
The language of the NET Act, its legislative history, and prior case law all
support the application of a standard of willfulness which requires proof that the
defendant was aware that his or her activities constituted infringement. Due to
the highly technical, complex, and at times extremely vague nature of the
Copyright Act, the government also must be required to negate a claimed good-
faith belief in the lawfulness of the activity. Otherwise there lurks a very real
danger of catching within the net of criminal infringement those individuals who
are engaged in apparently innocent conduct. Just as currency structuring is not
inevitably nefarious,364 the reproduction and distribution of copyrighted works is
not always motivated by a desire to steal another’s property.
364. See Ratzlaff v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 144-145 (1994).
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